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Abstract
These chapters provide a snapshot of the history of the Philippines from 1850 to 1963 from the
point of view of the Philippine communist movement. The papers trace the rise of Philippine
communism as an offshoot of the economic development of the country, which began under the
last half-century of Spanish colonial rule. It then narrates the changing composition of the
communist movement as the Philippines embarks on a path of tremendous political revolution
from Spanish, Revolutionary, American, Japanese colonial rule, then finally as a fledgling
republic.

Part 1. The Anti-Colonial Struggle (1850-1900)
The Philippine communist movement has its history intertwined closely with the
economic development of the country. Mirroring the economic developments in the rest of the
tropical world, the Philippines would only begin experiencing massive agricultural and economic
change beginning in the second half of the 19th century. The rapid industrialization in Europe and
North America during this period led to an explosion of demand for tropical products such as
coffee, sugar, tin, rubber and palm oil, among other tropical products; this, coupled with advances
in transportation via steamships and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, created a revolution
in the quantities and types of goods traded between Europe and its colonies.1 It was during this
period that the Philippines would start transitioning from a subsistence economy to an agricultural
exporter, changing the entire political and social fabric of the archipelago.
Not having encountered the hoped-for nutmeg and cloves that led the Spanish to colonize
the Philippines in 1565, the subsequent two and a half centuries of colonial rule over the islands
was singularly motivated by the galleon trade between Manila and Acapulco in current-day
Mexico. Over the centuries, Manila had grown in relative size as a trading center for goods from
all over the Asian region and by the 16th century, it had fallen under Muslim rule by Rajah
Soliman, a member of the royal family of Brunei.
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The Spanish arrivals instantly noted the significant presence of Chinese and Thai traders
calling on the Manila settlement upon their arrival, and thus decided to turn area into a
transshipment point for goods across the Pacific Ocean to their other colonies in the Americas, as
well as the governing capital of their new colony. This entrepôt trade consisting mainly of tea,
silk and porcelain from China and silver from the Americas, as well as a smattering of textiles,
wood, and other products from the Philippines, turned Manila into the first primate city in
Southeast Asia,2 enriching many of its Spanish residents and at the same time discouraging them
from embarking into other economic ventures as they had done in the New World. This important
conduit of exchange transformed both sides of the Pacific Ocean by allowing Asians to taste
novel American staples such as chili, tomatoes, tobacco and peanuts that would later become
integral parts of the Asian diet and by transporting Asian agricultural products such as sugarcane
and bananas that would later transform the economies of the Americas.
The limited number of Spaniards in this their furthest outpost of their sprawling empire
required the mobilization of the pre-Hispanic ruling class, the datu, into the sole mechanism by
which colonial governance would be enacted and enforced.3 Datu chieftains that brought their
people into the colonial sphere were rewarded with positions in the new state as
gobernadorcillos, becoming responsible for governing their area.
Many of the datu were drawn to cooperate with the new arrivals because the Spaniards
offered both the prospect of wealth and military protection from the constant inter-tribal conflicts.
In exchange, the chieftains were required to collect tribute on behalf of the new colonial
government to fund the Spanish bureaucracy and to implement the polo or system of periodic
forced labor that provided manpower for galleon construction, military service and other public
works.4 Due to the importance of the galleon trade, the Spanish passed a number of decrees, such
as a 1642 requirement for the planting of more coconut trees that are used for rigging, to
encourage the procurement of more resources for the trade.
Not all datu chieftains would kowtow to the conquistadores. The Sultanates of Sulu and
Maguindanao, whose Muslim leaders refused to bow to the Catholic cross, would maintain an
armed resistance that remained successful through the Spanish colonial period, and whose
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territories would form the southern boundary of the colonial state. The same anti-colonial
sentiment could be said of the people of the Cordillera region of Northern Luzon, famous for both
the engineering of their mountain-based rice terraces and their culture which developed distinctly
from the Hispanized lowlanders.
The rest of the Filipino population generally carried on with the subsistence-level
cultivation of crops, primarily of rice, as had been done for generations, as their limited dealing
with the Spanish colonial government consisted solely of the presence of the resident Spanish
priest, who concerned themselves mainly with the Catholicization of the populace. In essence, the
socio-political and economic fabric of the archipelago – consisting mainly of independent and
scattered polities residing near riverbank or coastal settlements called barangay – remained
largely unchanged by the arrival of the European colonists.
The situation changed drastically with the end of the galleon trade brought about by
Mexican independence in 1821. The Spanish colonial government needed to develop agricultural
exports in order to generate enough to maintain tax revenue to maintain the colonial bureaucracy
that had been heavily subsidized by the galleons. Trade liberalization was begun in 1834, as the
port of Manila, whose trade had been curtailed to protect the monopoly of the Spanish galleons,
was opened to commerce with other European vessels, leading to increased exports to Britain,
Hong Kong, the United States and China. The country’s banking system, begun in earnest in
1852 with the creation of the Banco Español-Filipino (now known as the Bank of the Philippine
Islands), the first bank in the Far East, would be joined a couple of decades later with the entry of
the entry of British banks, such as the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (now,
Standard Chartered Bank) and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (now, HSBC).
Beginning in the 1820s, American and British merchant houses, such as Russell & Sturgis and
Peele, Hubbell & Company would help fund new ventures and propagate new markets for
Philippine products.5
These changes were aided by the accumulation of improvements in communications and
transportation infrastructure. In 1854, the monthly mail between Manila and Hong Kong was
established. Thirty years later, communication was speeded up further by the opening of a cable
service between the two cities, driven mainly by the regional demand for services by the typhoon
prediction capabilities of the Manila Observatory. Regular direct steamship service between
Spain and Manila was initiated in 1873. The British-financed Manila Railroad from Manila to
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Dagupan, Pangasinan was opened in 1892. These and a myriad of other improvements fortified
explosion in the economic activity of the colony.6
The rise of commercial agriculture led to the substitution of export crops for locally
consumed food crops, changing the social landscape of the entire archipelago. Traditional
landholding and subsistence agriculture gave way to the formation of agricultural estates. Prior
to the arrival of the Europeans, land was held communally by the barangay with its allocation
presided upon by the datu. The Spanish introduced the concept of private property, awarding the
ownership of the land to the individual tiller, with the datu obtaining a larger share of the land,
owing to their privileged position. But as the export agricultural trade took off, the native datu
class would find their positions of privilege usurped by the growing Chinese-mestizo class –
offspring of successful Chinese traders that had decided to remain in the Philippines and marry
members of the local population.
The rise to pre-eminence of the Chinese-mestizo class was a by-product of the traditional
distrust and dependence of the Spanish colonial government on the growing Chinese presence in
the colony. Drawn at first by the galleon trade, traders from the Southern Chinese provinces of
Fujian and Guangdong flocked to the Philippines in increasing numbers beginning in the 1570s.
Apart from providing Chinese-made goods for the trans-Pacific commerce, the traders provided
wholesaling services for the Philippine commodities included in the international trade, as well as
provisioning Manila through the collection of produce from nearby provinces. From this trade,
the Chinese built a retailing network to service the domestic trading requirements of the
archipelago.
Fearing the dominance by the Chinese of the domestic retail trade, the Spanish
government expelled the Chinese from the Philippines in 1755. The Chinese-mestizos, having
taken Filipino customs including Catholic beliefs, were exempted from the forced repatriation. As
such, they found themselves in the unique position of accessing a decapitated trading network
that had been built by their forebears. Moreover, the development of a cash crop economy that
required collection and shipment through Manila, as well as the increasing complexity of the
local retail trade, provided this growing elite corps to become more involved in the national
agricultural economy than their Chinese forefathers had been.7
By the 1830s, the Spanish desire to strengthen the Philippine economy led to a gradual
trend toward the encouragement of Chinese immigration. Improvements in transportation would
6

Legarda, Benito. After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the
Nineteenth Century Philippines. Ateneo de Manila University Press: Quezon City, 1999, pp. 337-338.
7
Wickberg, Edgar. The Chinese in the Philippine Life: 1850-1898. Ateneo de Manila University Press:
Quezon City, 2000. (First Edition, 1965), pp. 3- 23.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084850

lead to an explosion of the Chinese population in the Philippines from 5,700 in 1847 to up to
90,000 by 1886. The return of the Chinese traders would provoke strong competition against the
mestizo retailers, leading to their displacement by the turn of the century. By 1898, the Chinese
retailers had attained their pre-expulsion status in Manila and occupied a very strong position in
the retail trade of almost every province.8
Thus, the Chinese-mestizo found themselves with surplus cash but little hope of
recapturing the domestic retail trade. As such, they would move their entrepreneurial interests
towards land-ownership and the growing agricultural export trade. Many of them would settle in
Central Luzon, the area immediately surrounding the capital, in search of a profitable agricultural
enterprise.
By 1870, the Philippines moved from a rice-exporting colony to that of a rice-importer,
making food security dependent on the price of the export crops. As rice-farming gave way to
export production, farmers became more dependent on cash-based transactions, and would
oftentimes borrow from wealthier landowners or money-lenders during times of poor harvests or
to pay for weddings or funerals. These loans would be collateralized via the pacto de retroventa¸
wherein peasants would ‘sell’ the land to the loaner with the option of purchasing the land back at
the same price within a specific period of time. The borrower continued to have usufruct rights
on the land, but was now seriously indebted. Pacto loans were difficult to repay and were usually
renewed until the debts had accumulated that were far larger than the plot of land was worth.
Eventually, the dispossessed farmer would become tenants on lands that were originally
theirs. In this way, the new colonial elite, many of whom were Chinese mestizos, became the
owners of the best land for export crops with its own labor force linked by kinship or networks of
personal relationships.
Apart from the Chinese-mestizo owned landholdings, many of these agricultural estates
ended up in the hands of the Spanish religious orders, who had accumulated their vast
landholdings over the centuries through purchase, donation or outright landgrabbing and later
rented them out to wealthy individuals for farming.9 Unlike the Spanish administrators who spent
at most three years in any one province, if at all, the priests and friars spent their lifetimes in
villages and often used their ecclesiastical offices to achieve political influence. By the 1880s,
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these friar brotherhoods had accumulated vast properties, amounting to some 200,000 hectares,
and at times operated these landholdings under an oppressive tenancy system.10
In this manner, the Chinese-mestizo and the Spanish orders would displace the datu class
as the main locus of power in the colony, and the competing interests between these two groups
would create increasing friction, as the economic resources flowing into land increased
throughout the decades.
All sorts of tropical products vied for pre-eminence as the main export crop of the
country. Attempts at encouraging the widespread export of different tropical products such as
wood, cotton, indigo and cinnamon met with limited success.11 However, the colony would find
its comparative advantage by the 1880s in the form of tobacco, abaca, coconut and sugar, crops
that became the main agricultural exports of the country.
The cultivation of tobacco, whose notoriously addictive plant seedlings were brought
from the Americas, became extensively grown in the colony because of a 1781 Spanish decree
which required peasants in certain areas of Luzon to plant tobacco and to purchase cigars only
from the state-led Tobacco Monopoly. The Monopoly was enacted as a mechanism to generate
state revenues but its abusive nature led to its abolition in 1882 despite providing up to one-half
of the revenues of the colonial administration. However, the privatization of the state tobacco
companies allowed the industry to thrive and maintain its previous production levels.12 As such,
tobacco thus provided much employment in both the planting of the leaf and the rolling of the
cigars, made mainly by women in Manila.
Another agricultural product of unique value to the colony was abaca hemp, a bananalike plant whose fiber was of great demand for rope-making due to its strength and resistance to
salt water. The increasing world trade and complementary shipping industry led to the explosive
demand for abaca-made ropes. The islands possessed an absolute monopoly of the product and
attempts to raise abaca outside the country met with almost complete failure.
The third product, coconut, provided a myriad of uses such as oil, margarine, soap and
food.

The mass production of underwear and soap from coconut oil contributed to the

improvement of hygiene and contributed to the rapid industrialization of Europe as mortality rates
decreased. After the drought in the American West of the 1880s, ending in the death of millions
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of cows, coconut oil was used in Europe as a substitute to beef fat and as margarine to replace
butter, whose prices had also increased because many people left the countryside to work in
factories during the Industrial Revolution.
However, it would be sugar that would become the colony’s top export at the turn of the
century. Unlike abaca, tobacco or coconut production, which required little capital and could be
grown in both large or small farms, the milling machinery necessary for production of export
grade sugar dictated that most production be organized on a plantation basis. The rise in
plantation agriculture corresponded with a rise in tenancy, with close to 20 percent of the farmers
not owning the land that they tilled by the end of the 19th century.13 The situation of increasing
land tenancy existed despite the fact that much of the archipelago was still unpopulated.
This early era of globalization also brought about a flood of cheap imports that decimated
some of the existing cottage industries that had flourished during the first few centuries of
Spanish rule. Most evident was the entry of cheaper machine-woven fabrics from Glasgow and
Manchester led to the decline of the textile industry that centered around the Ilocos and Iloilo
regions of the country.14 The lack of alternative income led many households in these areas to
migrate to the less populated provinces of central Luzon and Negros island in search of new lands
for cultivation.
The social changes in these areas were staggering. The Ilocos provinces, during the 1850s
were characterized as relatively highly developed, with agricultural, commercial and industrial
features owing to the production of rice and cotton. To the Manila markets, they sent great
quantities of rice, wheat, sugar, raw and manufactured cotton, among other items.15 A visiting
French cavalry officer visited the town of Paoay in Ilocos Norte and remarked that how many
cities in Europe would think themselves happy to have even half of what Paoay had?16 The
remnants of this significant economic base remains still visible to the present with the continued
existence of large mansions in most Ilocano cities, as well as the massive stone churches that are
strung out along the length of the Ilocos coastline, with two of which have merited listing among
UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites.

13
Lewis, W. Arthur, Tropical Development 1880-1913: Studies in Economic Progress. Northwestern
University Press: Evanston, IL, 1970.
14
Legarda, Benito. After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the
Nineteenth Century Philippines. Ateneo de Manila University Press: Quezon City, 1999.
15
Legarda, Benito. After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change and Entrepreneurship in the
Nineteenth Century Philippines. Ateneo de Manila University Press: Quezon City, 1999.
16
Renouard de Sainte-Croix, Felix. Voyage Commercial et Politique aux Indes Orientales, aux Iles
Philippines, a la Chine, avec de notions sur le Cochinchine et le Tonquin, pendant les annes 1803,
1804,1805,1806 et 1807. Vols 2-3. Imprimerie de Crapchet, Paris, 1810.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084850

Within a span of a few decades, the picture had changed. The end of the textile trade
eliminated the income generated by the men from cotton farming and the women from textile
weaving. The smallholders’ parcels became insufficient to maintain the population and Ilocano
migration, already under way, accelerated.17 The two Ilocos provinces saw their population
dwindle from close to 350,000 inhabitants in 1850 to slightly more than 320,000 by 1870.
Travelers to Ilocos now noted its populous and backward state.
The same story would repeat itself in Iloilo. Its textiles and fabrics were exported
throughout the world. A French visitor to the province would note in 1840 that the colors of the
cloths are so bright that they are admired worldwide. That year, 248,000 francs worth of cloth
was exported via Manila.18 At its peak in the 1850s, Iloilo’s urban population totaled more than
71,000, making the city of the same proportions as Sydney (54,000), Chicago (84,000) and
Buenos Aires (91,000) during that era. During that time, there were around 60,000 looms
operating throughout the province, employing about one-half of the potential female labor force.19
Not coincidentally, the third of four churches listed on UNESCO’s are located in Iloilo.
Within twenty years, the fabric export trade had vanished. European and American cloths
which were introduced into the market beginning in 1855 when Iloilo port was opened to foreign
trade, and produced to look like the native varieties provided a severe competition for the native
textiles. Sold in the market at much lower prices, the Ilonggo textile industry was reduced to
almost nothing by 1879. The city’s population would dwindle and would not reach its 1859
population until after the First World War.
Deprived of its economic base, the city’s entrepreneurs and farmers migrated across the
strait to Negros. Within a space of a half century, the sparsely populated island saw its population
grow 20-fold, as migrants seeking land to benefit from the expanding export trade moved there.
After many grueling months clearing tropical forests and cultivating new crops, many would find
their untitled lands later usurped by better-connected locals seeking to increase their sugar
plantations.
Thus, the vagrancies of globalization would also bring penury and insecurity to the
Filipino economy. Well-being and wealth would become dictated by the global price of their
export commodities. A coffee blight in Brazil in the 1870s led to a spike in global coffee prices in
17
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bringing untold wealth to the coffee planters in Batangas province. Such affluence led to wanton
displays of ostentation, such as the wearing of diamond-studded shoes and the burning of bank
notes for pleasure.20 But by 1885, the blight would spread to Luzon, devastating the Batangas
coffee industry and those dependent on it from which it would never recover.21
But such stories of rags-to-riches and back were rare. The more prevalent stories involved
less of a roller coaster ride, more akin to the relatively comfortable rice and textile producing
households of Iloilo that would become daily wage laborers working for sugar hacienda owners
in Negros within one or two generations as a stark example of the negative impact of these
changing social forces. This led to the situation wherein food security for farmers became subject
to changing economic winds; for example, during the 1880s when English purchases of sugar
declined, there was a subsequent increase in mortality brought about by instances of famine.
Nonetheless, the rise of export agriculture would bring fantastic wealth to many Filipinos.
The rise of the native middle class brought about the aspiration of a lifestyle akin to the European
one, leading to the increased importation of furniture, mirrors, pianos, carriages from Europe and
the United States, with one of the signs of the epoch being the annual visit of Italian opera
companies to Manila from 1867 onwards, even before the Suez Canal was opened.22
The developing complexity of the growing economy led to the creation of numerous new
paths of employment for urban Filipinos. By the 1850s workers in the arsenals and shipyards of
Cavite formed gremios or worker organizations for the mutual aid and benefits of workers. These
proto-unions or guilds soon spread among the tobacco factories, printing houses and other various
trades and occupations that arose in step with the growing wealth coming from produce from the
countryside. Among the earliest guilds were the Gremio de Obrero de Sampaloc, Gremio de
Escultores del Barrio Sta. Cruz, and Gremio de Carpinteros.23
Some of the first vestiges of nationalism and calls for social justice would come from
these urban-based working class unions. It was during the late 1800s that the gremios would
begin conducting mass action on account of abuses and maltreatment of workers at the hands of
their Spanish superiors, as well as to request for increases in pay. In fact, among the earliest
events that inspired Filipino nationalism was a mutiny in 1872 of workers in the Cavite shipyards
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and the execution of the mutineers and their sympathizers.24 These gremios would, in the coming
century, organize themselves further as trade unions and become the urban bases for the spread of
communist ideals.
The increased aspirations of this new elite would lead to the sending of their children
abroad to Spain to be educated, which eventually led to a generation of expatriate Filipinos
questioning why a third-rate European power, as Spain had become towards the end of the 19th
century, ruled over a rapidly developing nation. This ilustrado (enlightened) class, as they would
be known, brought forth the birth of Filipino nationalism in the 1890s, decades before other Asian
nationalists would imagine their own independent nations.
The Philippine national hero, Jose Rizal, personified the ilustrado nationalism of the
period. The offspring of a wealthy family leasing friar-owned lands from Laguna, a young Rizal
would be sent to Spain to study medicine in 1882 where he would band together with young
Filipino students to call for reform of the existing Spanish-Philippine colonial relationship and
write two novels questioning the power wrought by the Spanish friars in the colony. His writings,
as well as the writings of other ilustrado propagandists in Spain, were smuggled back into the
Philippines and inspired local leaders based in Manila to imagine a Philippines freed from
Spanish rule.
With the aim to foster the overthrow of the Spanish, Andres Bonifacio, a young urban
worker from a poor family in Manila, created the Katipunan, a more radical secret society that
prepared for armed revolution. Spanish knowledge of its existence prompted Bonifacio to launch
a preemptive rebellion in August of 1896. Though the Spanish military forced easily routed the
revolutionaries in Manila, outside the capital, one community after another declared itself free of
Spanish rule. Moreover, the execution of Rizal at the hands of the Spaniards in December of that
year would spark greater revolutionary zeal among his compatriots.
The defeat of Bonifacio and his proletariat following at the hands of the well organized
Spanish army would lead to the transformation of the leadership of the revolution. The Katipunan
would crystallize under Emilio Aguinaldo, a prominent Chinese-mestizo politico from Cavite,
whose early military successes in Cavite conditioned his election as Katipunan Supremo in place
of Bonifacio. Bonifacio’s refusal to acknowledge Aguinaldo’s leadership led to his arrest and
execution, a death that signaled the transfer of power within the hierarchy of the revolutionary
army from lower-class leaders to the provincial elite and ilustrado.25
24
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The Philippine Revolution against Spain would be different from the localized uprising
that sporadically occurred throughout the archipelago during the Spanish colonial era, as it
contained national undertones both in its aim for the political independence for the archipelago
and the extent of its scope of revolutionary followers throughout the territory. Moreover, the
military victories by the Spaniards could not undo what the Katipunan had done – transform
political conditions despite military defeat. Hence, despite the defeat of Aguinaldo’s forces in
1897 and their subsequent exile in Hong Kong, the Philippine Revolution proceeded as more
communities rallied to the cause of independence.
Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines in May 1898 with the help of the United States to
reclaim the leadership of the revolution. From his home in Kawit, Cavite, on 12 June 1898 would
declare the independence of the Philippines and begin to assemble a parliamentary government
under his presidency. The success of this Philippine Revolution in achieving an independent state
would be short-lived; although, its impact would be felt even after the surrender of its most ardent
revolutionaries.
The Philippine Revolution would coincide with the Spanish-American war of 1898,
drawing the most rapidly developing country in the world into the Filipino-Spanish conflict. War
stories circulating in the US reporting on the brutality of the Spanish army in Cuba prompted
widespread support for the US army to aid of the Cuban freedom fighters. The presence of the
Spanish colony in the Philippines drew the US Pacific Fleet into Manila Bay and provided the
Spaniards the opportunity of surrendering its Philippine colony to the United States rather than to
Aguinaldo’s republic.
Under the pretext of “manifest destiny,” the United States army would begin the bloody
conquest of the fledgling nation in 1899, repeating many of the brutal activities of the Spanish
army in Cuba that sparked the outrage that brought the US into war against Spain. The sheer size
and superiority of the invaders, coupled with the benefits noted by certain wealthy Filipino
plantation owners in becoming a territory of what had become their largest export market, spelled
doom for the fledgling independent state.
Despite this, Aguinaldo’s ragtag army fought courageously against the new colonizers.
More than 600,000 Filipino civilians, more than one-in-ten inhabitants, died during the FilipinoAmerican War that followed the Philippine Revolution, the bloodiest war the country had ever
seen. Though the dream of immediate independence sought by the revolutionaries ended with the
capture of Aguinaldo in 1901, the valiance of the Philippine revolutionary army ensured that
American rule over the islands would be predicated on its eventual disentanglement from United
States rule.
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It was during this period of great social upheaval that the first stirrings of an organized
peasant movement would begin. Unwilling to submit to further abuses from the government and
their landlords, strong-willed peasants would lead millenarian movements predicting the end of
the world and its rebirth as a new just society. These movements fused both Spanish Catholic and
traditional mystical beliefs under the pretext of the preparation for the creation of a new society
away from the exploitation they experienced from mainstream society. Some of these movements
would begin as orthodox religious activities, organized by the Spanish friars that would mutate
into revolutionary movements.
An example of these religious peasant movements is the Guardia de Honor de Maria
movement in Pangasinan, a province that experienced widespread Ilocano migration during the
19th century.

The Guardia de Honor was founded by the Dominican Order in 1872,

inauspiciously as a prayer group aimed at upholding Catholic orthodox practices among the
laity.26 Ten years later, fearing a growing cult in their hands, the Dominicans decided to sever all
ties with their Ilocano chapter. By then, the movement had evolved into a quasi-religious
movement, led by their charismatic leader, Julian Baltazar, prophesizing judgment day in 1886
and failing that, called for the creation of an autonomous state in the town of Cabaruan in
Pangasinan province. The Christian religious underpinnings of the movement were evident in its
nomenclature, with Baltazar being elevated as the personification of God Almighty, and his
successor Antonio Valdez, deemed as Jesus Christ.
With the chaos of the Philippine Revolution, the movement organized itself as a guerilla
army by amassing weapons from Spanish garrisons and battling against not only the Spanish and
later, the American forces, but also the Revolutionary army of Aguinaldo, whom they saw as the
military allies of their abusive landlords. Referring to themselves as Los Agraviados, the Guardia
de Honor turned the revolution into a class war, attacking Filipino-held haciendas in search of
food supplies for their growing number of followers. New peasant recruits were also tasked to
raid their landlord’s food supplies and move permanently to Cabaruan, where they could live
without needing to till the land anymore, since in heaven, nobody worked. This virtual utopia
could exist, as long as new followers kept pouring in to feed the existing population.
At its peak in 1901, Cabaruan would have a population of 25,000 and would find itself
unable to attract enough new followers to feed its residents. At this point, the Guardia de Honor
began attacking even peasant landholdings, undermining their own base of support. The peasantry
that had previously sought Valdez’s support against their enemies, now cooperated with the
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American colonial army to pacify the region. By June of that year, the leaders of the Guardia
would be executed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and reverse migration would leave Cabaruan
virtually non-existent.
A similar movement appeared in Negros Occidental, when a 50-year old plantation
worker named Dionisio Sigobela would flee to the mountains and attract a band of other
aggrieved workers to join his movement. Sigobela was himself born in Iloilo and like many of his
province-mates, he would migrate to Negros in search of a better life, lose his farm to a large
landowner and find himself working at a Spanish owned sugarcane plantation in La Carlota.27
Sigobela’s movement was a fusion of nationalist fervor and religious symbolism, with
Sigobela naming himself Pope (Papa) and comporting himself as a babaylan, a native shaman
from pre-Hispanic society.28 In line with the on-going Revolution of 1896, Papa Isio’s movement
would morph into a nationalistic movement that targeted Spanish authorities and ally themselves
with the Revolutionary armies in Negros in the quest for independence.
However, when in 1898 the Negros planters decided to ally themselves with the invading
Americans, their largest sugar market, Papa Isio denounced the planters as traitors and began
attacking the haciendas themselves. The conflict between Papa Isio’s army and the landowning
class took on characters of a class war, with the former plantation laborers fighting for the
destruction of the sugar industry and the redistribution of the haciendas into small rice farms.
In 1899, the insurgents instigated mass uprisings in the vast haciendas along the slopes of
Mt. Kanlaon and razed several towns in the course of a four month period. All in all, 56
plantations were burned out and 12 planters were murdered in that year alone. The American
commander noted that the insurrection was not against the United States but against the property
owners.
In response, the plantation owners decided to pool their resources and create a private
army to protect their haciendas. As the attacks succeeded in reducing the island’s sugar output,
the US Army also committed three battalions in hopes of quelling Isio’s guerillas. With the US
garrisons and the hacenderos private armies guarding the plantations, Isio would see his forces
slowly decimated by the superior firepower. Nonetheless, despite all of these resources and even
a sizeable bounty on his head, authorities were not able to capture the elusive peasant leader.
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Only after a failed offensive in 1907, now a sickly old man, Papa Isio surrendered himself to the
US Army.
Similar other millenarian peasant movements, such as the Santa Iglesia in Pampanga,
Papa Rios of Tayabas (now Quezon Province), Dios Dios in Leyte and the Pulajanes of Samar,
would appear during this period with the same intention of bringing social justice and religious
salvation to an oppressed peasant class. Depressed markets, political change and oppression at the
hands of the landed class threw peasants’ lives in disarray, while millenarianism offered them
solace and a rallying point for organized protest.29 The supernatural and religious undertones of
each revolution shows that these movements were not merely based on particular grievances such
as the redistribution of land or their own material well-being,30 but also as rallying cries against
the massive economic dislocation that led to the elimination of traditional and well-understood
social roles. Many of these movements occurred in areas of migration and new settlement, where
the traditional social ties were least evident.
The defeat of these peasant movements were generally caused by the capture of their
charismatic leaders and not by the resolution of peasant grievances, and as such, it would be in
these same geographic locales that future leaders, with more ‘modern’ ideologies that evoked
class rather than religious struggle would find followers among the impoverished classes. The
arrival of the new US regime was expected to improve the political situation of the country, given
the propaganda of democracy and principled governance preached by the invaders.
Unfortunately, despite the rapid economic growth that came with US colonization, the age-old
problems of landlessness and worker exploitation remained unresolved, allowing future leaders
preaching social justice to revive and enlarge these dormant movements.
Part 2. The Rise of the Left under American Rule
The gallant stand of the Filipino nationalists in the face of a superior army forced the
United States to use indiscriminate force to pacify the archipelago. The atrocities of the bloody
occupation, which included indiscriminate killing, scorched earth tactics and concentration camps
for civilians galvanized many American intellectuals such as writer, Mark Twain and steel
magnate, Andrew Carnegie to vocally question the entire colonial exercise.31 Among the worst of
the atrocities occurred in Balangiga, Samar, where in response to an ambush of American forces
at the hands of disguised Filipino guerillas, the US forced were ordered to transform Balangiga
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into a “howling wilderness,” taking no prisoners and killing anybody capable of carrying arms,
including ten year-old boys.32
To appease both the defeated Filipino revolutionaries and the anti-imperialist lobby back
home, American colonial rule became idiosyncratic, predicated on the notion that the invasion of
an independent state was really a selfless exercise to educate this backward society for
preparation for eventual independence – a policy not applied to other newly acquired US
territories such as Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Thus, the American administrators quickly
moved to establish all of the trappings of a modern democratic government and showcase the
colonial escapade as an instance of ‘benevolent assimilation’. The US embarked on a scheme
wherein the administration of the colony would be put back into the hands of local inhabitants as
soon as each area was pacified. The policy was also utilized to attract the elite supporters of the
Philippine revolution through their appointment as governors, mayors and even national
legislators – a policy akin to the conscription of the datu class by the Spanish authorities three
centuries prior. However, in stark contrast with the previous regime, the chosen elite supporters
could access positions much higher than the municipal level posts that they were allowed to attain
during Spanish times.
The need to demonstrate that the impetus for colonization was indeed ‘education for selfrule’ forced the US authorities to organize the election of provincial governors in 1906 and in
1907, parliamentary elections for the installation of the Philippine Assembly. The Partido
Nacionalista, which advocated immediate independence from the United States overwhelmingly
defeated the Partido Federalista that had desired a closer relationship with the US and showed
the continued support for ideals of the Philippine Revolution.33
More significantly, the victory by these candidates, mainly comprised of wealthy
landowners, provided the local and provincial elite with external sources of power emanating
from the US colonial government. Previously, local landowners garnered prestige and power
through the support of peasants and thus showered them with patronage and protection. As such,
the colonial experience would weaken the traditional social relationship between landlord and
tenant.34
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Among the provincial elite that would rise to national prominence were Sergio Osmeña
and Manuel Quezon, lawyers from the provinces of Cebu and Tayabas (now Quezon)
respectively. Notably, their rise to prominence began with their appointments as governors in
their respective provinces, as compensation for their show of support to the new US-led
government after the Philippine-American War. Their rising star status resonated equally with
the voters, to whom they would loudly also advocate independence and nationalism, allowed
them to become the two most powerful politicians in the colonial government until independence.
They continued enhancing their power throughout the US colonial period, as they would become
adept at winning support from the Philippine electorate by continually advocating an antiAmerican stance, yet at the same time eliciting favors from the US government via through
mutually beneficial arrangements.
Nonetheless, the arrival of the American regime to the Philippines marked a stark shift
from the non-responsive governance experienced during the Spanish colonial epoch. Transport
infrastructure in the form of ports, railways and highways were developed and improved. Health
services and sanitation were quickly established, especially in response to the cholera and other
epidemics brought about by the years of war. The public education system was expanded
significantly, shifting the lingua franca of politics and commerce in the country from Spanish to
English within a couple of generations.35
However, the temporary nature of US rule over the islands promoted the passage of
policies that inadvertently hampered the economic development of the colony and limited the
economic participation of US corporations in the new territory. For example, the US Congress
decreed that land holdings of US corporations in the Philippines were to be limited to 1,024
hectares, in order to prevent Filipinos from being exploited by a plantation economy. Major
American companies, such as rubber producers Firestone and Goodyear, could only content
themselves with 1000 hectare rubber plantations in Mindanao, despite their desire to undercut the
rubber producers of British Malaya that were serving the booming US tire market.
Such practices led to a relatively low pace of foreign investment in the Philippines, and a
slower rate of economic development, as compared to other tropical colonies such as Dutch
Indonesia, British Malaya or French Indochina.36 To illustrate, the total foreign investment in the
Philippines from 1900-1920 was approximately 11 million US dollars by only 16 US
corporations, in stark contrast to the 250 million US dollars invested in Medan, Sumatra in
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Indonesia alone from 1890-1929, where large plantations of more than 8,000 acres could be
opened.
As such, there were very few Americans involved in export agriculture in the Philippines,
whereas plantations on immense estate existed in all other European colonies, all financed with
European capital. By the end of US colonial rule, barely half of all foreign investment in the
country was American, despite the colony’s trade dependence with the mainland. US investments
in other countries, such as Cuba, Chile and Argentina were all larger than what it had invested in
the Philippines.37
It must be noted, though, that like most Philippine laws, such limitations were generally
subject to loopholes allowing well-connected businessmen to obtain large concessions. The Del
Monte Corporation, through its subsidiary the Philippine Packing Corporation purchased 1,024
hectares for a pineapple plantation in Bukidnon, Mindanao for its own planting, with the
government allotting another 13,000 hectares for farmer-planters. However, for expenses, the
farmers had to mortgage their lands to the corporation and in case of foreclosure the government
obtained ownership of the lands for redistribution to other farmer planters.38 A similar
arrangement was created for Dole for 5,500 hectares of land for bananas in Cotabato. As such,
these corporations obtained usufruct ‘ownership’ of massive plantations, without garnering legal
titles to the lands, as disallowed by law.
The regime change also allowed for the entry of socialist ideas through the return of
Filipinos who had been exiled to Spain due to the outbreak of war. One of these returnees, was a
journalist named Isabelo de los Reyes, who was deported to Barcelona after having been wrongly
suspected by the Spanish authorities of leading the members of the elite in support of the
Philippine Revolution. In Barcelona, he would become acquainted with Marxist ideas, bringing
their works to Manila in October 1901.39 His first action of organizing labor began among the
printers when he organized the Union de Litografos y Impresores de Filipinas in 1902. Later that
year, he organized the Union Obrera Democratica (UOD), the first labor federation in the
country, organizing the disparate gremios that had developed during the late Spanish period.
Aided by labor leader Herminigildo Cruz, the UOD began with a base of printers and
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lithographers, but would later include cigar makers, tailors, mechanics and workers from various
trades. 40
On July 4, 1902, symbolically choosing the US Independence Day, the UOD called a
mass meeting of its members. 50,000 of their members turned out for a demonstration in Manila,
demanding Philippine independence and alarming the US authorities who stationed troops in the
city. In a later mass movement in August, the UOD would clamor for other goals, such as wage
increases for its members. De los Reyes was arrested shortly and imprisoned under charges of
sedition, rebellion and inciting workers to increase the price of labor, a violation in the Spanish
Labor Code.
The arrest forced de los Reyes to resign his post and his successor, Dominador Gomez, a
medical doctor who had studied in Madrid where wrote anti-Spanish articles with other ilustrados
such as Jose Rizal, took over the organization and reorganized it into the Union Obrera
Democratica de Filipinas (UODF). This larger federation continued the call for the downfall of
American imperialism intertwined with labor demands such as an eight-hour workday, and the
recognition of May 1 as a holiday.

In 1903, the first May 1 celebration was held in the

Philippines under the auspices of the UODF with 100,000 workers and supporters turning out in
protest. In this year, the UODF set up its own newspaper, La Redencion del Obrero which was
shut down the following year but revived as Los Obreros. Gomez would be arrested for sedition
and sentenced to one year of hard labor.

One of the main leaders of the union, Crisanto

Evangelista would fall into conflict with the CODF and set up a separate union, the Union de
Impresores de Filipinas in 1906.
In essence, the organization of the trade unions in the country was clearly born of the
Philippine independence struggle, with its rhetoric that fused together trade union and political
demands.41 Moreover, unlike the millenarian peasant movements, the arrest of union leadership
did not cause the downfall of the entire labor movement, as new leaders were always available to
take up the cudgels of the struggle and reestablish the organizations under new guises and with
more numerous membership. In 1913, the UODF was reorganized as Congreso Obrero de
Filipinas (COF) by Hermenigildo Cruz, Gomez’s successor at the UODF, and Crisanto
Evangelista in an effort to reunite the labor front after the dissolution of UODF. It must be noted
that the labor unions at this point were relatively moderate in their claims, desiring mainly
protective labor standards, an 8-hour workday, protection of women and child labor and social
40
Kerkvliet, Melinda Trias. Manila Workers’ Unions: 1900-1950. New Day Publishing: Quezon City,
1992.
41
Pomeroy, William. The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration and Resistance! International
Publishers: New York, 1992.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084850

insurance. The unions would be successful in achieving some of these aims; in 1908, May 1
became an official labor holiday and the Bureau of Labor was created. On 1 May 1912, the first
law related to working conditions is promulgated.
Because of their roots in the independence struggle, the COF leaders found themselves
collaborating more and more closely with the Nacionalistas and their campaign for immediate
independence. These ties had developed through Cruz himself who had been deeply involved
with the Nacionalistas. Shortly after its inception, the COF, upon Quezon’s invitation, sent
delegates to attend the Nacionalista Party meetings in Manila.
Moreover, as the colonial government began sending missions to the United States to
lobby for independence on an annual basis, the COF became more closely involved with the
independence campaign. During the first independence mission in 1919, Crisanto Evangelista
himself would be sent by the COF to represent the interests of labor. The COF even supported a
resolution calling for an abstention from striking for all workers during the independence
missions, lest the strikes be misconstrued as a sign of instability and undermine the promise of
independence upon the existence of a ‘stable government’ in the islands.
By the 1920s, the COF had become close collaborators with the government, with some
of their leadership being appointed into the colonial administration. Leaders such as Cruz, then
appointed as Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of Labor, had become convinced that unions
should depend on government for assistance and protection.42
Despite their growing power and influence in the colonial government, the ability of the
COF to promote the cause of the labor sector they aimed to represent was not as strong. Though
the COF officers attempted to help settle labor dispute, many of the conflicts between labor and
management were still resolved by the Bureau of Labor officials.
By the end of the 1910s, the socialist rhetoric that permeated the labor unions began to
resonate among the rural farming communities. In 1919, the Union de Aparceros de Filipinas
(UAF) was organized by Jacinto Manahan in Bulacan, the first peasant union in the country.
Much like its urban version, the peasant union would reorganize a number of times, first
becoming the Confederacion Nacional de Aparceros y Obreros Agricolas de Filipinas
(CNAOAF) in 1922 before evolving into the Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KPMP or National Association of Philippine Peasants) in 1924.

The shift from

Spanish to the Philippine language was significant as it reflected a shift in nationalism among the
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people.43 Many of these peasant unions sprung up in Central Luzon, given its proximity to Manila
and the labor unions, and because the increasing population in that area had brought about an
increase in tenancy. Much like their urban counterparts, the rural unions desired very moderate
demands such as increased daily wages, access to cheap loans and larger crop sharing, with few
peasants questioning the landownership situation.44
The growing visibility of the organized labor and farmer sector ensured that the national
government could not turn a blind eye to the increasing economic and social problems gripping
the Philippines. However, the solutions provided by the US colonial government in solving the
growing tenancy problem was encumbered by the government’s attempts to transpose American
models of economic development to its far flung colony. The land ownership problem was
expected to be partially resolved by a cadastral survey of the entire archipelago to find out who
owned what land. At the same time, the government also implemented a Torrens titling system,
instituted in 1902, that issued deeds upon application after survey and court proof of ownership.
Instead, the implementation of legal titling that placed landownership based on a government
recognized title above the peasant’s traditional right to ownership, facilitated the further instances
of land-grabbing, as well-connected wealthy individuals were able to obtain title to lands held by
illiterate peasants.45
A second solution was the enactment of homesteading programs in less populated areas
of the archipelago, particularly the island of Mindanao to generate settler-led frontier
development akin to what had occurred in the continental United States. Applicants could claim
40-acre lots from the public domain after submitting an application with a survey to prove there
was no claim. Response to the homesteading opportunity was very small, caused both by the
cumbersome bureaucratic process for obtaining a homestead, and more significantly, the cultural
differences inherent in the conservative Filipino village structure that provided social penalties for
leaving the tight-knit family-clan.
A more likely explanation to the low settler uptake was the distinct historical
underpinning of the island-destination of the settlements. Mindanao, particularly its westernmost
areas, was never fully united to the rest of the islands by conquest by the previous Spanish
colonizers. At the turn of the 20th century, unlike the Catholicized majority in Luzon and the
Visayas, the population of the island remained mostly Muslim or animist. The Americans, at the
43
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onset of the Philippine-American War, understood the strength of the more powerful polities
among the Muslim sultanates, and as such entered into a peace treaty with the Sultan of Sulu,
Jamalul Kiram II in 1899 to ensure their non-participation in the war of conquest. Upon the end
of the Philippine American War, the peace treaty would be abrogated and the Moro-American
war of conquest would follow until the defeat of the Moros in 1913.
The third solution enacted by the new colonial government in overcoming the growing
tenancy problem was the purchase of the bulk of the friar estates and their conversion to public
lands for sale. The Spanish religious orders and the lands they owned had become one of the main
of lightning rods of discontent that drew Filipinos to the Philippine revolution, especially among
the elite plantation managers who were renting from them.
In 1903, the United States announced the purchase of 166,000 hectares of friar estates for
redistribution. However, only around half of the purchased lands were transferred to landless
peasants, with the remaining half, mainly virgin forest, were sold or leased to American and
Filipino business interests. Moreover, this first attempt at land reform was implemented with no
support mechanisms to ensure its success – no credit, cooperatives or technology provided to the
farmers. Unfortunately, many of these beneficiaries fell bank into tenancy, now to wealthy
Filipino hacenderos who later purchased or expropriated the lands when tenants as returned to
debt.46
Economic growth was expected to be boosted by a freer exchange of goods between the
Philippines and its new colonial master. In 1909, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act established
bilateral free trade between the United States and the Philippines. Within two decades it was
crystal clear how the free trade agreement between the two regions spectacularly improved the
economic development of the Philippines. Philippine agricultural exports increased five-fold
from about 80 million pesos in real terms during the 1900s to close to 450 million pesos in
1934.47 In addition, the contributions made by the export-led sectors were enhanced by the
impressive gains in rice cultivation. There was a massive expansion both in acreage planted to
cash crops and staple crops. In turn, these activities stimulated other non-agricultural sectors such
as electricity generation, transportation and domestic commerce.
However, these improvements came with a growing dependence on the US market.
During the first decade of the 20th century, Philippine exports were almost evenly distributed
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among its major trading partners: Britain, the US, China and Spain. However, after 1910, the US
share of exports went from approximately 32 percent to a high of 77 percent in 1932.48
Most significantly, the preferential access to a large sugar-consuming nation caused sugar
to become the country’s leading export, displacing the other primary export crops, like abaca
hemp, tobacco and coconut. The strong domestic sugar beet lobby in the US assured that tariff
protection be accorded to the commodity, allowing the New York price of sugar to be up to 150%
higher than the world price in the 1930s. Such a lucrative arrangement made the Philippine
economy overly dependent on sugar production, and by 1934, sugar plantations constituted 40%
of the crop area, 65% of the total export value, 30% of the national income and 40% of
government revenue.49
The other major export crops of the country, particularly abaca hemp and coconut,
received no benefits from the preferential tariff due to the fact that neither of these products were
grown in the continental US, and was sold in the US at the world market price. The primacy of
sugar as the country’s prime export aggravated the tenancy problem of the country given the
requirement for plantation-based for the processing of cane to sugar, as opposed to the other
export crops of the country. Its other export crops, such as tobacco, abaca and coconut could be
planted on large-scale or small-scale plantations.
The economic boom caused by the enactment of the free trade arrangement in 1909,
proceeded quite strongly and was boosted by a commodities boom caused by the outbreak of
World War I. Coconut oil exports, in particular, benefited from the war, because of its use in the
manufacture of glycerin for smokeless powder and nitroglycerin for explosives such as dynamite.
This economic boom was followed by a sharp contraction after 1920, as the commodities prices
fell after World War I came to a close. To illustrate this boom-bust cycle, the number of oil mills
ballooned to 41 in 1918, from only one three years earlier; however by 1926, only seven of these
mills were still in operation.50
As such, the decade of the 1920s became saw an increase in discontent among the
peasants and a revival of the dormant millenarian movements that exploded during the turn of the
century. Though the economic downturn was short-lived, lasting but a couple of years before the
colony returned to a path of development, the deterioration of landlord-tenant relations in the
countryside prompted the continued unrest during the 1920s.
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Traditionally, ties between local elites and peasants were akin to patron-client
relationships, wherein tenant farmers expected a more personal and traditional relationship with
their landlords that included protection, financial assistance during hard times and a guarantee of
rations for subsistence in exchange for the agricultural services that they provided. As their
power grew and their abilities to manipulate the national government became more apparent, the
now increasingly Manila-based and nationally empowered landlords becoming less interested in
the personal well-being of their tenants and more interested in promoting their rise within the
national bureaucracy and the lucrative benefits derived from such power.
The main impetus for the increase in government influence by the landowning class was
the 1916 passage by the United States Congress of the Jones Law, the first organic act promising
to grant the Philippines independence once a stable government was established. This law was
understood by the US colonial policymakers as a go-ahead to speed up the implementation of the
Filipinization policy of transferring more and more branches of the government bureaucracy to
the hands of locals.
With Filipinization, the dominant land-owning political class was able to consolidate
power further by uniting under the Nacionalista banner and utilizing its growing dominance of
the colonial bureaucracy to extract more economic rents from the government. The Nacionalista
dominated legislature undertook numerous policies favoring their own class, such as the passage
of bills exempting uncultivated lands from being taxed or the set up of the University of the
Philippines, whose state-subsidized education accepted mainly the children of the wealthy.
The most blatant act of colonial rent-seeking began in 1916, when the Philippine
legislature set up the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to finance export producers who wanted to
take advantage of the growing US market. The bank grew explosively during the economic boom
caused by the rise in commodity prices caused by the outbreak of World War I in Europe and by
1918, it held almost two-thirds of total assets of the Philippine banking system.
However, this phenomenal growth occurred because of corrupt banking practices. Loans
were dispensed without credit consideration, principally to well-connected owners of sugar
centrals and coconut oil plants, far exceeding the lending limits. When the basic source of bank
funds – government deposits – provide insufficient, the bank not only began printing money but
also made a systematic raid on the currency reserve fund in New York, snatching US$41,500,000
to lend in the Philippines.

When the prices of agricultural products tanked after World War I,

driving many borrowers to bankruptcy, the PNB also became hopelessly insolvent. However, the
size of the bank ensured that the devastation of the bank went beyond the PNB and affected the
entire economy. By 1921, the national currency was in shambles and the government was
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practically broke.51 The PNB fiasco was a major set back for the independence movement that
the Filipino electorate at large had been clamoring for since the turn of the century as it was
utilized as an illustration the Philippine government was not ready for self-rule. Such a situation
did not phase the ruling classes because although they publicly favored immediate, complete and
absolute independence to appease the electorate, the privately desired the benefits of self-rule
without the liabilities of ultimate authority.
Given their newfound source of power and money, landlords become less and less willing
to maintain a personal relationship with their tenants. The landlords spent most of their time in
Manila or in one of the provincial capitals, leaving the running of the hacienda to plantation
managers, who took a strictly business attitude to the peasants. Peasants were now expected to
pay for loans on time, charged for different services accorded to them, even lost the ability to
obtain to extraordinary assistance during times of difficulty. However, they still required that the
tenants provide the same amount of rents and obligations as they had provided in the past.
In effect, absentee landlords treated their tenants more as contractually-bound employees,
a social contract that the tenants now saw as imbalanced and exploitative. Yet, the tenants had no
alternative means to air their grievances as the new national status acquired by the landlords
allowed them to call upon government agencies or even the Philippine Constabulary to enforce
any legal claims they maintained against the peasants. The landlords even hired civilian guards to
protect their property and enforce the crop-sharing agreements.52
Not coincidentally, the Pangasinan plains where many of the Ilocano migrants had moved
became the breeding grounds in the formation of another millenarian sect, the Kapisanan
movement. The local peasants were attracted by the utopian and nationalist demagogue Pedro
Kabola, who promised these victims of land-grabbers, moneylenders and landlords salvation on
earth. Their planned insurrection was abruptly stopped on March 1925, when Constabulary agents
rounded up their leaders.
Similar occurrences would transpire in other areas of new settlement. In the early 1920s,
the Colorums, an egalitarian and nationalistic religious sect began to grow in northeastern
Mindanao. The growing sect was harassed by local authorities who failed to understand the rites
and purposes of the sect. The Colorum turned into open rebellion by 1924 and would be
suppressed with a severe loss of lives.
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Despite their resurgence in the 1920s, none of these millenarian movements would have
the following or the success that their revolutionary forebears would achieve. For many aggrieved
peasants and laborers, the leftist ideology of socialism and communism provided an
understandable and attractive alternative to charismatic religious movements.
Thus in contrast, the organized labor and peasant movements gained further strength and
experience during the 1920s, especially as they utilized different battlegrounds for promoting
social changes to alleviate their plight. The strike had been an old union weapon utilized by
unhappy workers since the late Spanish period, and this era witnessed instances of work
stoppages in cigarette factories, at the harbor in Iloilo, in the sugar mills of Negros, Pampanga
and Laguna, among others. However, the 1920s saw the formation of “general strikes” wherein
workers from several factories would simultaneously call for strikes in many factories in Manila,
as well as in factory branches in Rizal and Bulacan.53
Moreover, some of these strikes would take a deadly turn and inadvertently weaken the
position of the labor unions. The most notorious strike of the period involved the Manila Electric
and Railway Company (Meralco), an American company enfranchised by the city of Manila to
provide electricity and street cares to the city. In May 1919, company employees desired to talk
with company owners about changing their working conditions and asked the Congreso de
Obreros to provide them with assistance. When the Meralco general management ignored the
petition, since they considered their employees relatively well-paid, the employees went on strike.
The COF officials provided full support of the striking workers, as they were irked by Meralco’s
tyrannical and hostile position. Undeterred, Meralco their willingness to go head-to-head with the
strikers by employing strike breakers under guard by the Philippine Constabulary.
A bomb explosion in June broke the impasse. The homemade bomb left in one of
Meralco’s cars exploded and killed an innocent bystander. The bomb shocked the city residents
as it was the first time a death was linked to a labor dispute. The bomb signaled defeat for the
strikers, especially after a former Meralco employee admitted guilt and implicated the COF strike
committee chairperson in the affair. COF leader Crisanto Evangelista himself would be arrested
for making seditious remarks prior to the explosion.54 It had become slowly apparent that the
inability of the labor groups to obtain adequate concessions from the government had led to
disillusionment by many members of its moderate stance.
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The labor unions also continued to encourage labor demonstrations, but this time, these
demonstrations were enhanced by additional contacts to the burgeoning global labor movements,
as contacts with other labor movements with other countries intensified. The classic works of
Marx and Engel found their way into the Philippines, during this period and the workers began
desiring to convert their numbers into political power. Ironically, the impetus for such a party
formation would be initiated by Evangelista himself, whom like his predecessor Cruz, was a cardcarrying member of the Partido Nacionalista. In 1919, Evangelista was tasked to represent labor
by the Nacionalistas in the first independence mission sent to the United States, and there, he was
able to attend the convention of the militant Industrial Workers of the World.55
Exposure to the growing global communist movement, especially during the postRussian Revolution euphoria, encouraged the radical turn of the labor unions. The first attempt at
turning the union into a stronger political force happened in 1922, with the creation of the Partido
ng Manggagawang Progresibo by Antonino Ora, though the existence of this political party was
short-lived. However, the clear break between the Nacionalistas and the more radical members
of the labor sector happened in 1925, when Ora and Evangelista officially launched their Partido
Obrero, a political party whose manifesto attacked the Nacionalistas as being tools of American
imperialism and labor oppression. It is possible that Tan Malaka, Indonesian nationalist and
representative of Communist International (Comintern) for Southeast Asia, had inspired them to
form the political party advocating the communist ideology during his exile in Manila during this
period.
Over the course of the decade, the Partido Obrero and its associated Congreso de
Obreros would maintain more and more radical, left-leaning demands demands, patterning its
ideology more and more after the communist experience in the Soviet Union. With fellow labor
leader Jacinto Manahan, Evangelista attended a conference in Russia in 1928 and return claiming
that Russia was the only country in the world that promotes true equality and true national
democracy.
In 1929, the COF itself would be split between the moderate and radical factions, with
the leftwing Katipunan ng mga Anakpawis sa Pilipinas (KAP, Proletariat Labor Congress) led by
Evangelista, Manahan and Juan Feleo eventually splitting itself from the larger congress, now led
by Isabelo Tejada and Ruperto Cristobal. In August of 1930, the three KAP leaders would
organize the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas or the PKP, taking the extreme position for the
establishment of the Soviet in the Philippines.
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The symbolism utilized by the leadership in forming the PKP attempted to demonstrate
an ideological unity between the Philippine and Russian Revolutions. The creation of the central
committee of the PKP was done in the Templo de Trabajo in Manila on the 26th of August 1930,
the anniversary of the Cry of Balintawak that heralded the start of the Philippine Revolution. It’s
official public launch transpired on 7 November 1917 in Plaza Moriones in Manila to coincide
with the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. Nonetheless, the radical position taken by the
PKP was not be taken lightly by the government authorities and an immediate crackdown of the
PKP was implemented.
The creation of the PKP would happen concurrently with the appearance of the Socialist
Party of the Philippines (SP), another alternative political party seeking to redress the grievances
of the poor. Founded in 1932 by Pedro Abad Santos, a wealthy landowner and congressman from
Pampanga, the SP drew its support from peasant unions in Central Luzon, such as the KPMP,
than the urban unions that supported the PKP.56 Unlike its radical counterpart in the PKP, the SP
remained moderate in its stance and steered clear of the Soviet communist ideology. It was very
critical of the government, but it wanted to work through legitimate channels, discouraging
violence and organizing peaceful strikes and demonstration to achieve their moderate ends.
Even its aims were very moderate: mainly demanding 50-50 sharing of the crop with the landlord,
rather than the prevailing 70-30; and an end to usury. However, as a burgeoning political force, it
started choosing its own candidates for elections. Surprisingly, especially for the elite, the party
started to win.
The rise of these twin political parties, with their mass base in the urban and rural
impoverished sectors, and their eventual union in the coming decade would turn the peasant and
labor movements into a strong political force. Their electoral victories over the course of the
1930s would force the government to take a more proactive stance in understanding and
assuaging the grievances of the masses.
Part 3. The Growth of the Communist Party as a Political Force (1930-1941)
On 29 October 1929, the stock market in New York would crash, marking the start of a
worldwide economic downturn that would spread from the United States to Europe, Latin
American and numerous other parts of the world. This Great Depression, unprecedented in its
scale and duration, would bring about massive economic dislocation and social upheaval, leading
to the rise of dictatorship, fascism and at its end the deadliest conflict in human history.

The

sharp contraction in economic activity in the industrial countries of North America and Western
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Europe transmitted the Depression to Southeast Asia, as demand for many of the region’s primary
export products vanished. For example, the contraction of automobile production in North
America greatly diminished the demand for rubber in Dutch-held Sumatra in Indonesia, British
Malaya and even the meager rubber plantations in Mindanao.57 Until today, the Great Depression
is remembered as an era of intense suffering, massive unemployment and political trauma in
many parts of the world.
In contrast, the 1930s were a time of unbridled optimism for the Philippines. Though
certain Philippine agricultural sectors would be badly hit by the depression, many parts of the
country would remain unscathed and even flourish from the economic downturn experienced by
other parts of the world. In fact, the era is still fondly remembered by old folks in the Philippines
as ‘pistaym’ or peacetime, a time of relative prosperity that predated the horrors of World War II.
Among the worst hit by the Great Depression were the abaca plantations in the Bicol
region and the coconut growing regions in the area of Luzon just south of Manila, particularly
Laguna. Export volumes for abaca fell by more than 50% from 1928 to 1932, while those for
coconut produces fell by more than 40%. To illustrate the importance of these crops to the
economy, it must be noted that coconut exports had become an important export item by the
1930s, with 450,000 hectares of land planting to it and with coconut oil constituting 20% of
exports, from only 1% in 1890. Many of the farmers in these areas were forced to return to
subsistence farming which decimated their income levels. The economic devastation forced
many less able farmers to sell their lands to landlords, leading to an increase in tenancy. 58
The impact of the export slump spread throughout the other sectors of the domestic
economy. For example, the disappearance of the cash economy led to the evaporation of the
retail trade, with hundreds of stores in the affected regions ‘still padlocked’ in 1934. Rice prices
were halved from 1929 to 1931, remaining at that low level up to 1934. Landlords faced by the
cash crunch in Central Luzon tried to limit their costs by reducing the interest-free loans and other
benefits they had provided to their tenants, worsening the already precarious state of landlordtenant relations. The scarcity of money drove up the interest on informal credit leading to an
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increase of complaints about usury and indebtedness.59 Many workers were fired or given wage
cuts, while peasants were evicted in the larger estates.
As had been said before, not all regions suffered from the Great Depression. Many of the
non-traditional pioneering ventures of the US colonial period saw their incomes grow during the
period.

The abaca growers of Davao, whose production was pioneered by almost 20,000

Japanese settlers that had begun to settle in the area beginning in 1903, served the Japanese rope
makers and suffered little from the Depression. Its main markets of Japan and Russia remained
vibrant during the period and the industry’s continued success allowed Davao to attain more than
50% share of the total Philippine abaca production by 1938.60
Bukidnon’s economy grew from the commencement of corporate pineapple growing for
canning and export. The gold mining areas of Baguio and the Mountain Provinces of Luzon saw
a gold rush during the period, as gold prices skyrocketed world wide. Tobacco, the least extensive
of the major crop, enjoyed a relative boom during the Depression, as the recession forced many
American cigar smokers to turn to cheaper brands, bringing a welcome upturn to the Manila cigar
industry.
But the most controversial crop, and by the 1930s, the colony’s most important export,
sugar was hardly affected by the Depression. In fact, the sugar producers would even experience
a boom in the years 1933 and 1934, even while their counterparts in Southeast Asia, such as Java
in Indonesia suffered terribly. Preferential access to the protected United States market kept sugar
prices high. Unfortunately, because of the nature of its production, much of the income benefits
from sugar accrued primarily to the planter class, and less to the smallholders and tenants. This
subsequently led to a building boom in Manila and other provincial towns – set off by the low
cost of materials and labor.
This stark contrast between American suffering and relative Filipino economic success
would inadvertently become the catalyst for Philippine independence. The Great Depression saw
a rise in protectionism worldwide, as industrialists and planters blamed foreign imports as the
cause of the falling prices and rising unemployment. Ironically, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of June
1930 that was passed in the US raised tariffs by up to 50% on a wide range of goods actually
worsened the economic trauma by encouraging other countries to follow suit. US-based farm
groups, particularly dairy and sugar producers, decried the unfair competition coming from
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Philippine exporters that were exempted from this tariffs being a territory of the United States and
provided detailed proof indicating how Philippine imports rose substantially during the past
decade while American agricultural prices fell year after year.
Other social groups dispossessed by the Depression began voicing an anti-Filipino
sentiment in unison with the farmers. Labor groups, such as the American Federation of Labor
complained about the threat of competition posed by the entry of cheap labor from the
Philippines, decrying the willingness of Filipino migrants to live miserly on ‘fish and rice’ and
‘occupy one or two rooms only’. White supremacists protested the intermarriages between
Filipino migrants and Caucasian women. These imagined social problems could be instantly
resolved by the granting of Philippine independence, allowing the US to enact limits on the entry
of Filipino goods and migrants into the mainland.
The Philippine independence missions that the country had been sending to the United
States since 1919 finally cobbled together a sizeable enough coalition of these disparate groups to
compel the US Congress to enact legislation specifying a date and mechanism for the official
transfer of sovereignty. The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria provided a greater sense of
urgency for getting rid of the Philippine colony, stoking fears that the United States could be
dragged into war with an expansionist, militaristic Asian country.
In 1932, as the Great Depression deepened in the US, the independence mission led by
Sergio Osmeña, now a prominent Senator, and Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the Lower House of the
reorganized Philippine legislature, finally attained success in their continuous lobbying through
the passage of the Hare Hawes Cutting Act or the Philippine Independence Act. However, Senate
President Manuel Quezon, sensing the increase in popularity to be garnered by his rival Osmeña
could lead to his likely fall from power as the country attained national independence, urged the
Philippine Senate to reject the bill on grounds of its unfair provisions limiting trade and
immigration, while imposing permanent military bases in the country.
Quezon himself led the subsequent mission in hopes of obtaining improved legislation
from the United States. In 1934, Quezon came back with the Tydings-McDuffie Act, a carbon
copy of the original legislation but with the clause imposing military bases replaced with one
requiring naval stations instead. With Quezon’s support, the new but hardly improved Philippine
Independence Act was finally approved by the Philippine legislature.61 Now the United States
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had enacted a law providing a precise date for the long-delayed promised independence: 4 July
1946.
In 1935, the Philippines began the legislated ten-year transition period prior to the
attainment of full independence. This Commonwealth Period came with increasing limits on free
trade and immigration which satisfied the American farm and labor lobbies. A new constitution
was written and ratified; and the country elected Quezon and Osmeña as the President and Vice
President of the Philippine Commonwealth. Retired general Douglas MacArthur was hired as
Field Marshall to oversee the creation of the Philippine Army, especially with a militarized Japan
looming over the horizon.
Despite the positive effects brought about by the political changes, the negative effects of
the economic downturn still resonated among the downtrodden. The depression occurred at a
time when the expansion in Philippines’ most important agricultural area, the Central Luzon plain
was coming to an end, as the land frontier started to close. As new lands became increasingly
scarce, rents increased, tenant and laborer profits fell. 62
As before, economic downturn brought a revival to peasant unrest which led to additional
instances of peasant millenarian revolution. Though the movements drew from the same
constituency of oppressed peasants and mobilized them in like manner of violent attack in face of
improbable odds of success as the millenarian movements of previous eras, the 1930s millenarian
revolts had less of the religious, mystical overtones and espoused a more nationalistic,
independence-centered ideology. Most of these movements aspired for immediate independence,
though the independence they sought was more than just the creation of a separate state unbridled
by US rule.
Patricio Dionisio, a radical journalist and lawyer, started a movement that claimed to
have up to 100,000 members spread across most of Central Luzon. The Tanggulan (Tagalog for
Offensive) movement bridged the poor and middle class members in both the urban and rural
areas. Its declared aim was to achieve independence through armed uprising. However, in
December 1930, before it was able to take action, its leaders were arrested.
Unresolved tensions among the earlier described Kapisanan revolt of the 1920s would
make the area ripe a successor movement. As such, the Kapisanan followers would later join the
movement of the Philippine National Association, founded by Pedro Calosa. The PNA would
seize the town of Tayug in 10 January 1931 and massacre the constabulary detachment there,
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occupying the town and destroying the land records.

They had been hoping to ignite a

spontaneous revolution among the peasantry. Retribution was prompt and bloody.63
In 1934, a trade union leader, Teodoro Asedillo, evading arrest for participating in a
major Manila tobacco workers’ strike, took to the Sierra Madre mountains of Laguna and
Tayabas (now Quezon province) where he recruited an armed group. His guerilla struggle,
calling for independence and an end to unjust taxation, lasted for almost a year. Though he won
extensive support from the villages of the region, he would later be killed by the Philippine
Constabulary, the domestic police force which was under the command of the US Army since its
inception in 1901.64
Some of these instances of unrest had also taken a racist turn. The fall in copra prices in
1931 led to the mobbing of the Chinese in San Pablo, Laguna, the heart of the nation’s most
concentrated coconut production zone. The Chinese dominance of the country’s domestic trade
made them easy scapegoats for a suffering class. A large group armed with clubs and stones
marched from store to store, destroying as they went. Reportedly one Chinese person was killed
and several injured. While the local police did nothing, the governor and several constabulary
units quickly restored order.65 These attacks against the Chinese were not attacks mainly based
on their ethnicity but on their representation of the ‘oppressive class’ in accordance with ‘class
struggle theory’.
Later that decade, the most deadly of the millenarian revolts, the Sakdal uprising would
transpire. The waffling of the Nacionalista Party on the independence issue stimulated the growth
of other radical groups which agitated for immediate independence. The most influential of these
groups was the Sakdal (Tagalog: Accuse) movement founded by Benigno Ramos, a disaffected
government clerk that was a former protégé of Quezon. After breaking with Quezon and the
Nacionalistas, Ramos founded a Tagalog newspaper with the same name, and launched a
campaign predicated on the independence issue and attacking the Nacionalistas. His proindependence streak mixed with his staunch support of radical pro-peasant demands, such as the
redistribution of land, the end of landlord power and even the end of taxation. His fervor and
propaganda struck a responsive chord in the provinces surrounding Manila and his growing
popularity encouraged him to form the Sakdal Party in 1933, whose main program was a call for
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complete and absolute independence by the end of 1935, opposing the establishment of the
Commonwealth government. By 1934, the Sakdalistas had an estimated 200,000 members; the
Party contested the legislative elections of that year and garnered three seats in the lower house,
one governorship and a number of municipal offices. However, the Sakdal triumph was shortlived with many of his elected party members defecting to the Nacionalista contingent.
Faced with a bleak future, Ramos and the remnants of the Sakdal party – mainly its rural
constituency – became increasingly scathing in their criticism of the government and the
Nacionalistas. The government reacted by passing laws obstructing Sakdal meetings. The
repression of the Sakdals, coupled with bad harvests and limited government support, culminated
in an outright revolt in May 1935, as 65,000 partially-armed party members attempted to seize
municipal buildings in 14 major towns in Laguna, Cavite and Bulacan at sundown. Hard-pressed
Constabulary units from the provinces and Manila fought three engagements with the Sakdalistas,
perennially receiving disturbing reports of an impending attack on Manila, supported by Japanese
aircraft. The insurrection was suppressed by the Constabulary in the next day with an
unprecedented loss of dissident lives, estimated to be more than 100 persons.66 Ramos fled to
exile in Tokyo and would later return with the Japanese occupying army. It must be noted that the
areas where the Sakdal uprising occurred was generally in the areas negatively affected by the
Depression, rice growing Bulacan and coconut growing Cavite and Laguna.
It would be in this decade when the fates of the millenarian and communist movements,
the rural and the urban poor would begin to intertwine more closely, as they found themselves
beleaguered by a common enemy: the landlord dominated government supported by the
Americans. Both Dionisio and Asedillo were members of the PKP but the party did not support
their actions.
The start of the Depression also witnessed the beginning of the Partido Komunista ng
Pilipinas. The PKP closely followed the Comintern line in its activities and stand on issues. Its
formal proclamation on 7 November 1930 – coinciding with the 13th anniversary of the Russian
Revolution – showed its symbolic affinity to the Soviet movement.

Such revolutionary

propaganda and radical demands espoused by the newly formed Partido Komunista led to the
arrest of their main leaders, Evangelista and Manahan in 1931 under charges of sedition. Despite
being allowed out on bail, the communists would find themselves unable to obtain permits for
rallies and being harassed by the police. Unable to obtain permits for their rallies and even their
party congresses, the PKP and the KAP, Evangelista’s radical labor union from which the PKP
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obtained its membership, decided to proceed with their party congress in defiance of the law. All
400 delegates of the 31 May 1931 meeting were arrested though only the main leaders were held
more than 48 hours.
Later in September of that year, both the PKP and KAP were deemed illegal by a Manila
court, a judgment that would be affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following year.
Evangelista, Manahan, among many other PKP members were convicted and sent to jail in 1933.
The public support by the PKP with the Tayug uprising was one of the reasons proposed by the
government to justify its outlawing, though there was very little evidence pointing to actual
cooperation between the movements. Ironically, foreign communists criticized the PKP for not
having been in touch with the Tayug peasant rebels, and as such, failed to provide them with a
definite and clearly defined revolutionary program and leadership.67
Nonetheless, these repressive policies succeeded in crippling the KAP and PKP, before
these fledgling organizations could take off.

KAP-sponsored activities suffered from poor

attendance, while more than 500 PKP members went so deeply underground that it was virtually
impossible to contact them. Manahan himself would switch to the government side, while Ora
would be killed in a car accident in January 1931. Despite the disappearance of the PKP, the
peasant unrest in the provinces, and the strikes in Metro Manila continued.
In stark contrast with their urban based counterparts, the rural sector in Central Luzon
experienced more unification during this decade. To help unite the Pampango peasants, Pedro
Abad Santos set up the Aguman ding Madlang Talapagobra (Kapampangan for 'Union of the

Toiling Masses') in 1934. The AMT existed in parallel with Abad Santos’ Socialist Party and
virtually no distinctions were made between the party and its amorphous trade union. By 1938,
this movement had also garnered approximately 70,000 members.

On the other hand,

membership in the KPMP had grown to 60,000 members. As a show of even stronger force, the
two largest peasant movements in Central Luzon, AMT and KPMP, agreed to act in unison and
form a coordinating committee in 1939.
The government did adopt a handful of laws during the mid-1930s that were supposed to
resolve the differences between the peasant and large landowners. These laws were enacted as
part of President Quezon’s “Social Justice” program, but they never intended sweeping reforms.
In fact, the laws generally included protection and escape-clauses for the landed elite, given that
they had been the ones writing and enacting the laws.
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For example, the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933 was passed to protect tenant interests
through a more equal sharing of inputs and produce. This was enacted to appease the complaints
of the rural peasantry regarding usurious practices by landowners, and protection against arbitrary
ejection of tenants. However, the law was hobbled by its unworkable conditions of enforcement,
requiring the landowners themselves to petition for its local introduction. The law was amended
in 1937 to provide 50-50 crop sharing, a guaranteed 15 percent share of the produce to the tenant,
irrespective of the amount of debt to the landlord and for landlord-tenant contracts to be written in
the local dialect. Nonetheless, even after this amendment, the law never provided any significant
effect, since its enforcement was always placed at the hands of the landlord.68 In fact, in 1939
and 1940, thousands of cultivators were evicted by the landlords because they insisted on the
enforcement of the Tenancy Act.
Other laws that were passed under the guise of social justice were the Minimum Wage
Act and the 8-Hour Day Labor Act, at least for some industries. He created a National
Commission of Labor and a National Commission of Peasants in which left-wing groups were
included and given board posts, although conservative organizations were carefully ensured
majority representation.69
As part of the Social Justice program, Quezon pardoned Evangelista in 1936, as a
showcase of rapprochement between the government and the labor organizations. In addition,
Quezon legalized the PKP in October 1937, although it was unclear whether he had the power to
do so since it was a judicial act by the Supreme Court that led to its suspension. Part of the
reason for the change in the government treatment of the communist movement was the growing
fear of Quezon of the rise of fascism, particularly its Japanese version, that he felt required
national unity.70 Although a more likely reason for the act of forgiveness was Quezon’s need to
increase widespread support from labor as he desired an amendment to the recently passed 1935
Constitution that forbade him to run for re-election in 1941. The government’s ability to co-opt
much of the membership of the PKP divided the remaining members of the urban labor
movement. The KAP itself would see its membership dwindle as the Commonwealth Period
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progressed, and Evangelista himself admitted that by 1940 the labor movement in Manila was
weak and divided.71
Nonetheless, with their renewed political rights, and greater assurances from the Quezon
government not to interfere with their ability to hold meetings and demonstrations, the remaining
PKP decided to step up with its political movements. The idea of a merger with the Socialists
was proposed by Abad Santos, given the weakened state of the PKP. With the support of the
Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), the PKP and Abad Santos’ SP were able to unite
and form the Communist Party of the Philippines, with Evangelista as chairman, Abad Santos as
vice-chairman and Guillermo Cappadocia as Secretary General.
Though united in name, the PKP and SP never really coalesced properly as a singular
united entity. The differences between the SP and PKP involved not only personal animosity
among the members and other quotidian organizational problems, but proceeded into the realm of
ideology. The rural-based socialists were generally lukewarm to the urban communists whom
they thought were ‘godless’ agents of Moscow; while the communist saw the socialist as
anarchistic, too lazy to read Marxist literature and prone to violence.72 The lawyer Abad Santos
never really saw himself as a secondary figure to the unschooled Evangelista, who by this time
was frail and sick. Abad Santos often made press statements contrary to the official Communist
Party line. Nonetheless, the Communist Party formed one of the few minority parties in existence
that had the gumption to combat the Nacionalista Party that thoroughly dominated Philippine
politics.
In any case, as the decade wore on, the rising strength and militancy of the labor and
peasant movements became more and more apparent, despite the disunity among the communist
leadership. In 1938, there were 188 recognized trade unions, with more than 45,000 members, a
number which did not take into account the unrecognized unions. By 1941, the figure had grown
to 438 unions with more than 100,000 members. Trade union led strikes numbered 57 in 1937
had grown to 203 strikes involving almost 28,000 workers by 1940.
The same story could be said about the increasingly militant peasantry. Peasant struggles
against tenancy conditions rose from 663 events involving less than 2,000 tenants in 1937, to
1,374 events involving more than 4,600 tenants in 1940. However, much of these instances of
peasant activism was carefully planned and manipulated by leaders. Even in the late 1930s, when
the KPMP and AMT had merged, the central leadership of these unions could not orchestrate the
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peasant actions. Leaders merely helped to structure the growing unrest in the barrios, but they did
not foment or instigate it.
What did occur despite the lack of singular leadership among the working and peasant
classes was the increasing show of unity among striking workers. In 1937, the protests of a few
tenants on the Sabani estate in Nueva Ecija developed into a major strike by nearly all of the of
the 2,000 tenants there in 1938. On 1 May 1935, three thousand peasants paraded in San
Fernando, the capital of Pampanga, four years later, the parade had grown to 30,000 farmers.
Peasants in Calumpit, Bulacan and Balanga, Bataan went on strike in January 1939 to support
thousands of striking peasants in Pampanga. These concerted peasant strikes kept repeating itself
throughout the decade.73
This increased militancy heralded a swift reaction from the political class. Beginning in
the last years of the 1930s, landlord and business groups clamored for laws restricting worker and
peasant organizations. Central Luzon became the hotbed for peasant discontent and the Philippine
Constabulary were called on to combat many strikes in the fields. In mid-1941, the Constabulary
had taken over the municipal forces in a great many towns of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan,
Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, Zambales, Laguna, Cavite, Batangas and Tarlac Provinces. In
Pampanga province, where the peasant struggles reached their peak, a rightwing strike-breaking
organization, the Cawal ning Kapayapaan (Kapampangan for Knights of Peace) was set up to
terrorize peasants.74
But the rising awareness and seeming unity of the impoverished classes left them
undeterred in their attempts at achieving political empowerment in the face of strong opposition.
Perhaps the most significant evidence of the peasantry’s growing unity and political awareness
was in the ballot boxes. Starting in the 1937 elections, peasant organizations decided to support
candidates and themselves run for local and governmental positions in Central Luzon. For this
purpose, the Popular Front electoral ticket, comprised of candidates selected by the different
unions and parties such as the SP, AMT, and KPMP was created in 1936. During their first
attempt at electoral victory, two municipalities attained peasant-backed mayors and councils.
The meager victory would translate into more substantial results in the following
electoral season. In the 1940 election in Central Luzon, councilors and mayors, all running under
the Popular Front ticket, were elected in a dozen towns of the Central Luzon provinces of
Pampanga, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija. In Pampanga alone, their candidates won nine mayoralties
73
Kerkvliet, Benedict. The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. New Day
Publishing, Quezon City, 1979, pp. 45-47.
74
Pomeroy, William. The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration and Resistance! International
Publishers: New York, 1992, p. 99-100.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084850

and a majority of council seats in eight of those municipalities. Their candidate for governor,
Pedro Abad Santos himself, lost by only five thousand votes.75
These meager but consolidating political gains achieved by the growing peasant and
working class movements would be abruptly put to an end on 8 December 1941. A few hours
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese planes began bombarding targets all over the
Philippines. The Japanese would bring the Second World War to the shores of the Philippines
and within weeks, the Filipino nation-in-waiting would be faced with a new occupier.
Part 4. The Japanese Interlude (1941-1945)
The mounting military aggression of the Japanese in Manchuria, and then Indo-China in
the 1930s provided a clear signal to the Filipino leaders of an impending invasion of the rest of
Southeast Asia. In response, the first steps taken by the Philippine Commonwealth government
upon its establishment in preparation for self government was the creation of a self-defense force.
Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon appointed retired general Douglas MacArthur as Field
Marshall and gave him the responsibility of crafting a feasible defense plan for the country. His
grandiose war plan envisaged a force of 11,000 men, backed by a reserve force consisting of
40,000 men to be trained each year. MacArthur’s defense plan included meeting the enemy at the
beaches of every invasion point, which the US government thought unfeasible. In 1941, the
Philippine defenses consisted mainly of air and ground forces scattered around Luzon, 10,000
scouts fielded around the capital and a single US battlecruiser anchored off Panay Island; most of
the archipelago was left underprotected.76
Nonetheless when the Japanese did attack the Philippines on 8 December 1941, the attack
still came as a surprise. Japanese fighter squadrons attacked Northern Luzon within a few hours
of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor across the Pacific in Hawaii and the coordinated air raids
destroyed the aircraft stationed at Clark Air Base, the headquarters of the colony’s air force since
1903, virtually eliminating the archipelago’s air defenses within hours. That same day, Japanese
naval combat units landed and began seizing airfields and ports to support the larger invasion.
None of these landings encountered much fierce opposition, despite MacArthur’s plan to
defend the beaches. Despite the integration of the tens of thousands of US troops with the
Commonwealth government’s standing army into the United States Army Forces in the Far East
(USAFFE) these soldiers consisted only of 32,000 men, approximately 12,000 of which were
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Philippine scouts.77 This defense force was no match for the Japanese onslaught as they marched
into the rest of the country. Within weeks, the subsequent Japanese invasion forces had attained
all their initial objectives and were in a position to invade the Central Luzon plain and following
that, the capital.
By Christmas Eve, MacArthur realized the futility of his original defense plan and
signaled to his field commanders to withdraw into the Bataan Peninsula, a more defensible
position at the mouth of Manila Bay. Manila was declared an open city to spare its citizens from
harm and the Commonwealth government of Quezon and Osmeña were moved to the island of
Corregidor. The defense of Bataan and Corregidor was intended to keep the overwhelming might
of the Japanese troops temporarily at bay until support from the rest of the US armed forces could
be sent to the Philippines.
But the support troops never came, despite MacArthur’s constant pleas for the sending of
land, sea and air resources. Sensing abandonment by the United States that had prioritized the
war on the European front rather than in the Pacific, Quezon sent word to US President Franklin
Roosevelt asking whether the bloodshed wholly necessary and questioning the right of the United
States to demand loyalty from its citizens beyond its willingness to render actual protection. In
mid-February, Quezon asserted that further armed resistance in the Philippines was useless,
proposing the Philippines be granted immediate independence so that the country could declare
itself neutral in the war, calling upon both Japanese and American forces be withdrawn from the
country. The US response in both cases was prompt and unequivocal: the Filipinos could not
surrender.78
As time went on, with none of the promised reinforcements arriving, the defeat of the
Philippine defense force became inevitable. Quezon, Osmeña and MacArthur were evacuated by
submarine to Australia, where in relative safety, MacArthur would utter his famous promise to
return. On 9 April 1942, depleted by malnutrition, malaria and unyielding Japanese firepower, the
Philippine Army on Bataan surrendered to the Japanese. After having valiantly held off the
Japanese for three months, the ordeal of the USAFFE forces were not yet over; the defeated army
was forced to trek by foot for sixty-five miles to the nearest railroad station. This “Death March”
led to the death of ten-thousand troops. The following month, on May 6, Corregidor, too, would
fall, marking the complete control invasion by the Japanese Army over the Philippines.
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Prior to the invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese had constructed a carefully prepared
plan of integrating the Philippines and its other new territorial acquisitions in Southeast Asia into
a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, their term for their enlarged Pacific empire. In many
parts of Southeast Asia, they would present themselves as liberators of Asian nations from
Western oppression. They constantly spoke of an Asia for Asian peoples.
Such propaganda would have resonated very well in the Philippines half a century prior,
when Emilio Aguinaldo and his revolutionaries begged for Japanese intervention in support
against their war of independence versus the Spaniards. But the fifty years that had passed since
the arrival of the Americans had changed the Philippine outlook, at least in the Northern and
Central parts of the archipelago. By the 1940s, the Philippines were the most Westernized people
in the region and their national aspirations were about to be fulfilled through an enacted US law
promising independence.
Moreover, due to the proximity of Japan, the archipelago housed the largest Japanese
community in Southeast Asia, with more than 25,000 persons residing there at the start of the
war. The Davao area in Mindanao became particularly noted for its large Japanese immigrant
population that cultivated abaca. The fear of a Davao-kuo state akin to the Manchu-kuo state
carved out of China by the Japanese imperial army was often expressed. These characteristics
contributed to the inability of the Japanese to convince the majority of the Filipino populace to
willingly cooperate with the Japanese, let alone see its Imperial Army as anything but an
unwanted invader.79
Nonetheless, the Japanese still attempted to pursue its propaganda campaign of colonial
liberation on the Philippines. It needed to somehow co-opt the existing political elite that already
administered much of the colonial government at both the central and local levels. Hence, the
Japanese military searched for members of the elite willing to collaborate with the Japanese army
in maintaining the governance of the new colony.
As a sign of one-up-man-ship over the Americans, the Japanese decided to declare the
independence of the country a few years earlier than the date promised by the US. On 14 October
1943, the Japanese appointed former Senator Jose P. Laurel as the new president of an
independent Philippines. Though the independence declaration had all the trappings of a transfer
of power – indeed, Aguinaldo himself was tasked with hoisting the Filipino flag – there remained
no doubt that the Japanese army remained in firm control over the government.
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The collaboration with the Japanese among the elite was not strongly challenged by the
Commonwealth government-in-exile; prior to his departure to Corregidor, Quezon himself left
instructions to the political leaders left behind in Manila to cooperate with the Japanese for the
sake of the Filipino people. Nonetheless, it was never easy for the Japanese to maintain the
collaboration among its Filipino followers as most Filipinos refused to believe that the Japanese
occupation would be more than short-lived. As such, many Japanese collaborators saw
themselves consorting with both the Japanese armies and the Filipinos that continued to resist the
Japanese.80
Not everyone heeded the call of surrender issued by the United States government on 6
May 1942. The wartime resistance movement in the Philippines was one of the most widespread
of any occupied country.81
Anti-Japanese guerilla movements involving local citizens were organized in practically
every island. In Mindanao, different guerilla armies consisting of both Christian and Muslim
rebels continued to fight against Japanese aggression. These armies were headed by different
prominent Mindanaoans such as Salipada Pendatun, Datu Gumbang Piang and Tomas Cabili. In
Luzon and the Visayas, guerilla forces were organized by the uncaptured members of the
USAFFE and also by local politicians, individual Filipinos and nonmilitary US citizens living in
the Philippines. These USAFFE guerillas, comprised mainly of men from the landowning class
that had taken military training in the Philippine universities, remained under MacArthur’s
command from his headquarters in Australia. The USAFFE guerillas succeeded in integrating
many of the disparate guerilla organizations throughout the country. Although they sporadically
attacked Japanese troops, the USAFFE guerillas were ordered by MacArthur to limit hostilities
and contact with the enemy, favoring a “lie-low” policy that concentrated on obtaining
information for the Americans in preparation for their expected return. Behind this policy was a
fear that large actions against the Japanese were likely to cause reprisals directed against the
civilian citizenry, as well as the fear that a successful guerilla movement may endanger the ability
of the US to regain the Philippines.82
However, a separate anti-Japanese guerilla group was organized in Central Luzon in the
form of the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP, People’s Anti-Japanese Army),
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having full Filipino leadership and an orientation toward national freedom. The Hukbalahap or
Huk army conducted its own guerilla activities apart from the USAFFE in Central Luzon. The
Huk resistance movement was built upon the remnants of the agrarian and labor movements in
Central Luzon that had been dismembered by the Japanese occupiers. The Japanese fascists saw
the Communists as their first and last enemy, and arrested the party leaders for propagating antiJapanese sentiments during the 1930s. In late January, the Communist Party’s frontline
leadership, including Pedro Abad Santos and Crisanto Evangelista, were arrested by the
Kempeitai, the Japanese political police. Evangelista would be tortured and killed for rejecting all
enemy overtures, while Abad Santos would be spared due to his old age, though would later die
in captivity before the end of the Japanese occupation.83
Although the members of the KPMP and AMT had discussed possible armed resistance
in the event of an actual invasion by Japan, they had made no concrete plans to that effect.
During the chaos spawned by the first few weeks of the invasion, many peasants acted on their
own, some even taking the opportunities to attack landlords or members of the Constabulary in
retaliation over past grievances. Later, the more experienced peasant leaders who had escaped
capture by the Japanese took the initiative in organizing the peasant anger into a guerilla
movement.
In late March 1942, several of these armed bands met in Pampanga and baptized
themselves as the Hukbalahap. They elected AMT leaders Luis Taruc and Casto Alejandrino, as
the commander and vice-commander of the movement. The bulk of the original Huk army core
was formed by KPMP and AMT members, although many urban based members of the nowdecimated communist party and labor unions would join them later. These prewar organizations
were dissolved and reconstituted as the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC).
The first communiqués between the Huks and MacArthur sought to unify their
movements with that of the remaining USAFFE guerillas, but complications and mutual
suspicion sometimes led to hostile relations.84 In fact, fierce battles sometimes took place when
the Huks and USAFFE units met.85
Taruc himself epitomized the continuity between the peasant movements of the 1930s
and the Huk movement. A son of a tenant farmer who grew up in Pampanga and Bulacan, he met
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with Pedro Abad Santos in 1936 to inform the AMT leader of his desire to join the peasant
organization. Taruc also joined the Socialist party and held office in the merged Communist
Party. From 1937 until the Japanese invasion, he was a major figure in the Pampanga movement
and widely respected among the peasantry in Central Luzon.
Alejandrino was of similar background to Abad Santos, was a well-to-do landlord from
Pampanga who sought to speak on behalf of the peasants. In the 1930s, he joined the AMT and
Socialist party, also holding a position in the merged Communist Party in 1938. He was one
among the dozen or so winners during the 1940 elections that had run under the Popular Front
ticket, elected as mayor of his hometown Arayat, Pampanga.
While benefiting from the earlier peasant organizations, the Huk pushed the peasant
movement in Central Luzon beyond what it had been prior to the Japanese occupation. By
unifying peasant resentment towards both the Japanese invaders and their collaborating
landowning class, the Huks attracted more and more followers, and by the end of the war more
were involved than had been active in peasant organizations during the 1930s. By September
1944, the Huk army itself had around 12,000 guerrillas among 76 squadrons. The experience of
the war taught the Huks to become more disciplined in their formation of a Luzon-wide network
of leaders and cadres, solidifying the organization formed from the disparate unions of the 1930s.
The Huks were divided into two fronts: one in Central Luzon, and another in Southern Luzon.86
However, the real force of the Huk resistance was the strong support of the villagers, who
provided the Huks with manpower, information and food. A Huk clandestine committee at the
barrio level was used to organize the logistics of the army: assessing what the guerillas needs and
collecting food from the farmers houses, among others.87 Though a number of rural residents
supported the Huks because of their desire for Philippine independence, majority supported the
rebels because of what the new regime had done to their lives: fear, death destruction and
repression were far worse than anything they had known before. The adversity brought about by
the Japanese occupation reinforced a major lesson villagers had learned in the 1930s – the
necessity for collective action.88
By the end of the war, the Hukbalahap army had become very effective in resisting
Japanese rule by performing numerous tasks to undermine the Japanese army: sabotaging
government buildings, assassinating officials, ambushing convoys and stealing supplies, among
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others. According to Taruc, the Huks had killed more than 20,000 Japanese citizens or
collaborators and weakened the hold of the Japanese army over Central and Southern Luzon. By
1944, the Huk had become the most effective resistance organization on Luzon89 and was the
only guerilla group that had successfully carved out liberated zones in several provinces north of
Manila. 90
After having driven out the Japanese army in its bailiwicks, the Huks took up the
responsibility of ensuring peace and order and their presence kept down the instances of crime in
the area. Morphing into more than just a guerrilla movement, the Huks began creating a separate
political ruling structure that allowed the liberated villages to govern themselves.
Starting in 1942, elections would be held in thirteen of the twenty-seven municipalities of
Nueva Ecija and other Huk-dominated villages throughout Central Luzon, allowing for the
creation of a separate government system under the leadership of the a BUDC Council. By 1944,
Pampanga, Bulacan, and parts of Tarlac, Zambales, Bataan and Rizal were firmly under Huk
control.91 BUDC Council leaders officiated at weddings, baptisms and funerals, and even issued
marriage licenses and baptismal certificates. In a Nueva Ecija barrio, the BUDC government
leaders organized a jury of villagers to try a man accused of murder. Not only did this illustrate
the peasant movement’s development, but it showed innovation because neither a barrio
government nor trial by jury was provided for in Philippine law.
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The presence of such a

political organization was what truly distinguished the Huks from the USAFFE and other guerilla
movements.
However, more than just a separate political entity, the BUDC Councils became more
akin to separate police states than ran every administrative item at each barrio. Their BUDC
imposed taxes and communized the barrio economy so that provisions could be laid aside for Huk
operations. Barrios run by certain undisciplined Huk members allowed for the occurrence of
grudge killings. The Huks themselves admitted that many of the 20,000 casualties that they had
inflicted on the enemy were landlords, caretakers working for the landlords, bandits who stole
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from peasants or simply personal enemies. As such, the Huk movement had a mixed reputation
even among the peasantry in Central Luzon.93
The remnants of the Communist Party that had evaded arrest and remained in the cities,
sought to promote their own anti-Japanese activities. The Communist Party, now headed by the
wealthy Lava brothers, Vicente and Jesus, both medical doctors, helped organize the disparate
labor unions to form the United Front Movement in February 1942 as a civilian counterpart to the
military Huk movement. The United Front attempted to promote the communist indoctrination of
Huk-controlled peasant areas through the set-up of schools engaged in the explanation of
Marxist-Leninist doctrines. Though the peasants failed to learn the meaning of “dialectical
materialism,” they did understand the analysis of the class situation and their oppression at the
hands of the landlords and the government.
Members of the United Front sought other non-violent means to undermine Japanese
rule such as the establishment of mobile radio stations, publication of leaflets, among others.
However, strong Japanese military control over the capital made any organizational activities
among the urban-based workers very difficult. In 1943, the Japanese military were able to locate
the mobile radio and arrest many more of the party leadership. Thus, the urban-based Communist
Party virtually evaporated during the war years as the Japanese made it difficult and dangerous
for any kind of labor or communist movement to develop.94 It must be noted though that the
leaders of the Huk army, particularly Taruc and Alejandrino remained Communist Party officials,
although they were originally from its rural Socialist Party segment.
Apart from their new political autonomy, the rural areas of Central Luzon showcased
improved economic conditions, despite the economic hardships caused by the Japanese invasion.
The difficulty faced by the Japanese in integrating the Philippines into their Co-Prosperity Sphere
was not just due to the distinct political or cultural situation of the country in comparison to her
Southeast Asian neighbors. The economic production of the country was geared towards
providing raw materials and agricultural goods for export to the United States.

The country’s

main resource export of sugar was of little value to the Japanese war economy, in stark contrast to
the rubber and tin of British Malaya and the petroleum in the Dutch East Indies. Immediately
upon the start of the occupation, the Japanese strove to convert the sugarcane plantations in
Negros and Central Luzon into cotton farms for the production and export of textiles – something
of greater importance to the East Asian economy. The ambitious plan of expanding cotton
93

Lachica, Eduardo. Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt. Solidaridad Publishing House: Manila,
1971. pp. 110-111.
94
Kerkvliet, Benedict. The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines. New Day
Publishing, Quezon City, 1979, p. 77-97.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2084850

growing areas in the country from 2,000 to 455,000 hectares within a five year period, ended up
in a total disaster. The breakneck speed by which the conversion of the agricultural fields was
expected to be achieved caused a serious rice shortage as upland rice fields were converted for
cotton lands in Luzon.
Prior to the Japanese invasion, the Philippines had not been self-sufficient in rice and
food production, relying on imports from its Southeast Asian neighbors paid for from export
earnings from the sugar trade. The elimination of the US sugar market and its revenues created a
palpable shortage of rice, despite Japanese forced imports from Saigon, Vietnam. The rice
shortage was worsened by the destruction of the transport and communication systems wrought
by the invasion, the degenerating peace and order situation in the countryside and the draconian
attempt of the Japanese administrators to radically change agricultural production patterns.
Immediately upon the arrival of the Japanese, rice prices spiked, as rice fields were abandoned by
farmers fleeing for safety. Emergency measures to control rice prices and centralize procurement
of rice through the Bigasang Bayan (National Rice Corporation) failed to stem the shortage and
merely led to rationing and the creation of a black market in the rice trade.
The situation was made worse by the unwillingness of disgruntled Filipino to cooperate
with their Japanese invaders. In fact, the control of the rice supply became part of their antiJapanese resistance. The Huks mobilized the widest number of people to keep the rice harvest
from falling into enemy hands. As soon as the rice ripened, the rice was harvested and rushed to
remote places or hidden in any kind of cavity. Release of rice to the market was heavily
regulated, with each rice agent given licenses issued by the movement.95 The Huks also instituted
rigid price-control regulations in their controlled towns and barrios, and thus were able to reduce
profiteering to a minimum.
Ironically, the rice shortage in the Philippines occurred at a time when the rice fields saw
an increase in rice yields. What had changed, however, was the new agrarian conditions brought
about by the war that benefited the average peasant. Most of the areas large landowners left for
Manila during the invasion and could not or would not return. Ignoring pre-war sharecropping
arrangements, peasants kept the entire harvest of the rice fields after supplying the Huk forces,
instead of supplying the Japanese as ordered by the absentee landlords. 96
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As the Philippine economy ground to a halt during the later years of the war, the relative
importance of food in exchange for other items became more significant. The declining value of
cash revived a barter system, with rice becoming the most sought after commodity. Pianos,
jewelry, clothes, decorated chests and other pieces of furniture from the cities flooded the
countryside as formerly wealthy persons desperately sought to exchange their remaining
possessions for something to eat. As such, the economic situation of the peasants of Central
Luzon improved drastically as the rice they grew became the most sought after commodity. It
was not an uncommon sight in Central Luzon to see small huts where peasants resided replete
with expensive carved four-poster beds and massive armoires. Hence, not only was more rice
staying in the hands of the peasants, the peasants themselves obtained absolute control over
where the rice would go if it did leave and how much to obtain for it in exchange.
By the end of the war, the shortage in both food crops and cotton products sharpened the
anti-Japanese feeling among the populace.97

Compounding the situation was the arrival of

additional Japanese troops starting in June 1944 in preparation for the immanent invasion by
returning American troops. The arriving troops needed to be fed but much of the rice imported
from other Japanese territories was on ships that had been sunk on the way.98 The acute hunger
and famine brought about by the devastation on the economy is among the more traumatic
memories retold by the survivors of World War II in the Philippines.
As the war in the European front progressed and the defeat of Axis powers became
imminent, the Allies began strategizing for the Pacific front. The planned reconquest of Southeast
Asia in 1944 and 1945 was drawn as a two pronged attack through Burma in the west and the
Pacific islands in the east, bypassing most of Southeast Asia through a direct attack on Japan
itself. However, MacArthur, partly for political reasons wanted to regain rather than bypass the
Philippines. This decision gave the Philippines the unfortunate designation of being the only
Southeast Asian territory occupied by Japan where a large-scale military campaign of reconquest
was mounted.
Beginning in October 1944, when the first US soldiers landed in Leyte, the Philippines
became among the bloodiest battlegrounds of World War II. The refusal of the Japanese Army to
surrender to the superior force of the returning US army and their Filipino guerilla supporters
required that each territory or city be captured via intense fighting. Manila itself had to be
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retaken through American carpet bombing and building by building, street by street warfare,
killing a large proportion of its inhabitants and turning Manila into the most devastated city in the
world after Warsaw. Even after being driven out of the major cities, the Japanese forces dug into
the mountainous interior of the country. The Japanese army would continue fighting in the
jungles only until the atomic bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 forced
the emperor to finally surrender.
The recapture of the Philippines by the American armed forces and the devastation it
wrought was utterly unnecessary. In fact, by the time of Japanese surrender, many parts of
Southeast Asia, such as Malaya, Singapore and Indo-China had not been recaptured by the Allies.
For these colonies, the defeat of their European colonial masters at the hands of an Asian country
provided an irreparable loss of prestige to the ‘superiority’ of the Western colonial system.
Countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia prevented the returning French and Dutch armies from
retaking their lands and used the opportunity to successfully declare themselves independent. For
much of Southeast Asia, the Japanese occupation provided a positive historical effect, as it
provided the impetus for the end of colonialism, an effect that was absent in a country that had be
promised independence ten year prior.99
When compared to the other countries of Southeast Asia under Japanese control, the
occupation of the Philippines stands out as an extreme example of both human and material
devastation. Over one million Filipinos were wounded or killed during the Occupation. Manila’s
entire business district, 70 percent of public utilities, three-quarters of factories and stores, 80
percent of the finest residential areas were all destroyed. Cebu City, the country’s second largest
city was also devastated.100
Ironically, the impact of World War II on the Philippine-American colonial relationship
was the emergence of a special relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, erasing any
historical memory of the bloody occupation by the United States little more than a generation
earlier. The brutality of the Japanese occupiers made the American colonizers appear benign by
comparison, while the image of Filipinos and Americans spilling blood in union in defense of the
archipelago evoked a sense of fraternal solidarity among two peoples. Till today, save for the
Moros in the South, the Americans are still seen as ‘liberators’ of the Philippines, despite the fact
that the high death toll and wanton destruction of Manila and other Philippine cities was a
consequence of US carpet bombing raids caused by an unnecessary American re-conquest.
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The defeat of the Japanese at the hands of the returning American army was welcomed
by the Huks. As word of their return spread, the Huks increased their efforts at overthrowing the
Japanese regime.

From December 1944 to February 1945, the Huk squadrons pressed the

Japanese, liberating towns along their way. The Huk army offered their services as guides,
informants, and even fought side-by-side with the US army as the pockets of Japanese resistance
throughout Central Luzon were eliminated. The US army was surprised to see how in certain
provinces, the Japanese opposition had been totally wiped out, with the areas already under full
Huk control, with elected local governments. Provisional governments up to the provincial levels
were established with Alejandrino placed as governor of Pampanga, Jesus Lava in Laguna, Juan
Feleo in Nueva Ecija among others. The Huks believed that presentation of full Huk
administration would force the US government to recognize their political organization and their
acceptance by the reestablished Commonwealth government.101
However, the Commonwealth government, now run by a returning President Osmeña
who had taken over upon the death of Quezon in August 1944, replaced most of the Huk men.
The appointees eventually gave way to appointees of the ruling Nacionalista Party, even if many
of them were under the cloud of claims that they had been collaborating with the Japanese during
the war. The Huks were not only disappointed by the non-recognition of their guerilla army by
the returning US government, but moreover was described as a bandit organization intending to
establish a communist government in the Philippines after the war. Since the USAFFE units were
the first to make contact with the Americans, the Huks felt these units influenced American action
against them.
Worse, the American military, distrusting the Huks to the end, ordered their disarmament
and began arresting its leaders. Taruc and Alejandrino would be captured by the American army
on 8 April 1945 and imprisoned for seven months under charges of communism and even of
collaboration with the Japanese. Alejandrino was finally released after the Commonwealth
government found no case against him. Taruc was also released shortly after, but he complained
of being maltreated during his imprisonment.102 Ironically, Taruc’s guerillas, who were first to
offer their services to the Commonwealth and who probably suffered most, ended the war
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unrewarded and in disgrace.103

Worse, some members of the Huks would be executed by

‘reactionary troops’ under the command of US soldiers: 108 Huk belonging to the 77 CIE were
executed in Bulacan in 1945.
Nonetheless, the defeat of the Japanese in 1945 provided an air of optimism in the
countryside that the three years of war had extinguished. Although the peasants understood the
difficulty that lay ahead, stemming from the need to rebuild from the destruction wrought by the
war, as well as from the need to deal with the returning landlords, their experience of peasant
organization and self-government empowered them and provided them with legitimate avenues of
projecting political power to improve their lot. Huk leaders, such as Alejandrino and Feleo,
discussed means by which the returning Philippine government could be influenced so that it
would take a more progressive stance on the social and economic issues confronting the nation.
Because of the Hukbalahap’s achievements and political strength in Central Luzon, they expected
that Osmeña’s government would have to take their interests into account.104
Unfortunately, the optimism of the Huks would be dashed by the political struggles
fraught in the subsequent months. Within a couple of years, the newly independent Philippines
would find itself fighting another war, this time among its own compatriots.
Part 5. The Changing Political Struggle under the New Republic (1946-1963)
The end of the Second World War returned the intense level of optimism to a devastated
nation. Though certain sectors desired a postponement of the long-awaited recognition of the
Philippine independence struggle given the ravished circumstances the Philippines found itself in
right after the war, the overwhelming desire of the Filipino people to finally complete the struggle
they had begun at the turn of the century made the independence proclamation impossible to
defer. So on 4 July 1946, the United States flag was lowered and the Republic of the Philippines
was once again declared an independent nation.
Though many Filipinos believed that it would, the independence proclamation did not
resolve was all of the pressing political, economic and social problems of the new nation. One
problem that the new Philippine government had to deal with was the issue of collaboration with
the much-hated Japanese during the war. Many of the Filipino ruling classes had joined the
Philippine government that was set-up by the Japanese for reasons of survival, private gain, or
even the supposed need to protect the Filipino people from further abuses.
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As the US reinvasion forces neared Luzon in December 1944, Japanese-appointed
Philippine President Jose Laurel and his cabinet fled from Manila to Baguio. In April 1945, with
the American troops advancing towards Baguio, some cabinet members such as Manuel Roxas,
Jose Yulo and Quintin Paredes escaped into the American lines. Interestingly, the press release
authorized by MacArthur’s command declared the capture of Paredes, Yulo and the others, and
the liberation of Roxas.105 Roxas would be immediately flown to Manila and reunited with his
old friend MacArthur, returned to active duty as a colonel on MacArthur’s staff and built up as
among the ablest Filipino leaders.
However, it remained difficult to understand the distinction between Roxas’ role during
the Japanese occupation with the rest of his compatriots that were labeled as collaborators. Prior
to the war, Roxas was designated as the presidential successor in case of capture of Manuel
Quezon and Sergio Osmeña. He was captured in April 1942 and was offered the presidency of
the puppet republic but pleaded having a history of coronary trouble. He later remained as the
chief adviser of Laurel, was appointed chairman of the Economic Planning Board and the
Bigasang Bayan (National Rice Corporation), and basically remained at work in the Laurel
cabinet until the end.
Yet his absolution under the hands of MacArthur gave Roxas the needed political boost
to ascend the presidency. He established a Liberal Party split from the dominant Nacionalista
Party and formalized a two-party system that would be in existence for the subsequent three
decades. Endorsed by both Quezon’s widow, Aurora, and MacArthur himself, Roxas was primed
to defeat the incumbent but aging President Osmeña, now much-weakened by his wartime exile,
in the 1946 election to select the first president of the Republic of the Philippines.
In contrast, the rest of the members of the wartime Philippine government had to undergo
trial to prove that they should not be held liable for treason. Prominent wartime politicians,
including Laurel himself, were tried under a people’s court, many of them claiming to have
worked with the Japanese under the guise of nationalism. Not unexpectedly, Roxas in 1948
decided to grant amnesty to all collaborators, although less than one percent among the wartime
leadership was really ever convicted.106 Thus the political elite remained intact, with the war
diminishing neither the size nor the authority of the mainstream establishment.
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The retention of elite power was now in direct opposition to the newly found power
experienced by the Huks during the war. Returning landlords, whose own wealth had been
devastated by the war, demanded more from the peasants but provided them with less. Most
became very stingy with the agricultural loans, provided little money to pay for agricultural
expenses, and some even demanded back pay for unpaid rents from the Japanese occupation
period. To peasants that had experienced their brief moment of relative freedom under their
elected Huk government these demands were unacceptable, and many villagers once again joined
peasant organizations and agitated for larger shares of the harvest. In response, government
troops, the Philippine Constabulary and private armies funded by wealthier landlords were tasked
to violently convince villagers to accept the new status quo. For example, in December 1945,
landlords from Talavera, Nueva Ecija tasked their armed guards to forcibly take a fifty percent
share of the harvest, despite an earlier agreement to limit the landlord share to 40 percent. These
social conflicts were made worse by the state of the farming infrastructure, with many irrigation
canals, roads and communication lines remaining inoperable due to the wartime fighting.107
Despite this fighting, many in the peasantry resorted to peaceful pre-war means to obtain
solutions to their problems. In May 1945, numerous peasants supported the creation of the
Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM, National Peasant Union) – under the
presidency of Mateo del Castillo, a Communist Party politburo member, – which unified the
surviving members of the Hukbalahap, KPMP, AMT and other peasant groups that preceded it.
The PKM specifically lobbied for larger crop shares of up to 60 percent to the tenant, the sharing
of agricultural expenses, low interest loans from rural banks, guaranteed rice rations, among other
pro-peasant reforms. Its membership rapidly grew to 500,000, nearly four times the combined
membership of the two largest prewar peasant associations: the KPMP and AMT.108
As an organization, the PKM was more advanced than earlier peasant associations. The
haphazard and uncoordinated methods of the AMT were replaced by smooth-running committees
and highly involved membership. The PKM leaders organized sessions to educate villagers on
agrarian problems and on leadership to create future heads for the movement.
A similar reorganization of the labor unions that were dormant during the war occurred in
the urban areas. In July 1945, from the ashes of the pre-war labor movements sprung the
Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO). The movement was spearheaded by Guillermo
Capadocia, Felixberto Olalia, Mariano Balgos and other surviving members of the Communist
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Party, many of whom had fled to the rural areas to join the Huks during the war. Their limited
number at the onset, depleted by both pre-war and wartime anti-communist policies, forced the
Communists to align themselves with other less radical labor groups, like the journalists union
and the union of railroad workers.
The serious economic conditions of post-war Manila gave the CLO credibility as it
focused its attention on the working conditions. The war had caused tremendous dislocations in
the Philippine economy, production was drastically reduced, while the average cost of living in
Manila by mid-1945 was eight times what it had been in 1937. The nightmare for most workers
that for those that had jobs, they were still paid with prewar wages.109 The CLO utilized prewar
tactics of aiding striking workers, providing lawyers to represent workers and sending petitions to
management as a means to improve the lot of the worker, allowing it to generate certain increases
in labor salaries even during these difficult times. By the end of the 1940s, the CLO had around
10,000 card-carrying members.
However, the strongest weapon of the PKM and to a lesser extent because of its smaller
size, the CLO, was the ballot box. The Communist Party, headed by Vicente Lava, convened a
conference with the existing labor and peasant unions in September 1944 to discuss plans of
action in expectation of the end of the Japanese occupation. The results of this conference became
the basis for the creation of a new political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), which was
formed in July 1945, and included the Communist Party, PKM and CLO among its membership.
Much like its Communist Party predecessor and formulator, the DA represented another attempt
to unite the two streams of impoverished voters: the Central Luzon based peasant movement and
the urban leftwing laborers, into a single political force. The program of the party was to prevent
the Japanese collaborators from taking office and to formulate a more progressive economic
stance towards workers and peasants.110
For the 1946 election, the DA decided to endorse the presidential candidacy of Osmeña
in order to prevent the collaborator, Roxas, from taking office. However, the DA organizations in
the provinces nominated their own candidates for the national legislature, the only other positions
up for election during that year. The DA served a similar purpose as the Popular Front party of
the 1930s, but was far more coherent than what the Popular Front had been. And most
importantly, the DA was extremely successful.
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In the elections of April 1946, the DA succeeded in getting a respectable number of
representatives elected to the national legislature. Six of the nine DA candidates in Central Luzon
were elected to the House of Representatives and the extent of their victories was overwhelming.
Huk Commander in Chief, Luis Taruc and PKM leader Amado Yuson received 85 percent of the
vote in Pampanga.111 The DA candidate in Tarlac received an estimated 75 percent of the vote.
The Communist Party Secretary General, Jesus Lava, also won a seat in Bulacan. However, their
following did not spread outside their bailiwick of Central Luzon. The two DA candidates in the
capital Manila fared extremely poorly, barely obtaining ten percent of the votes of the winning
candidates. The same losing fate was achieved by the DA’s 12 other candidates in the rest of the
country.112
Despite their overwhelming victory in Central Luzon, the newly-elected Roxas
government refused to allow the six DA congressmen-elect from taking their seats. By this time,
Central Luzon had erupted in tremendous violence as the repression from the returning landlords
and the government forces had turned worse, forcing many peasants to retake their World War II
arms in reprisal.

After the April elections, repressions became worse and clashes between

government forces and armed peasants escalated. Roxas used the violence as a pretext to declare
widespread irregularities in the elections and charge the six DA congressmen plus a seventh
congressman-elect supporter from Bulacan with acts of terrorism.
The expulsion of these elected congressmen from the peasantry was not just a reaction of
an elitist president fearing the rise of a labor- and peasant-based opposition that could eventually
contest nationally the candidates of the twin elite political parties of the Nacionalista and Liberal
Parties that had dominated elections in the country. Roxas’ decision to expel was predicated on
the need for the national legislature to pass an onerous bill that the overly nationalistic DA
candidates vehemently opposed.
The United States government had entered into two treaties with the about-to-be
independent Philippine government under the supposed pretext that it would help the
development of the country. Despite the suggested benefits for the Philippines, the United States
thought it best to ensure the approval of the treaty by the legislature by stipulating the condition
that only its approval would allow for the release of US$620 million in rehabilitation funds –
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funds that the war-devastated country desperately needed. The first treaty was the Military Bases
Agreement, which gave the US the right to maintain military bases in the country for 99-years
after independence. The second was the Philippine Trade Act which extended the free trade
relationship between the US and the Philippines; this preferential access to the undamaged US
domestic market was something many agricultural exporters desperately wanted. This second
bill, however, entailed additional provisions that obnoxiously infringed on Philippine sovereignty
including US control over Philippine monetary and exchange policy.
Its most notorious provision was the ‘parity rights’ clause, which accorded to US citizens
the same rights to land ownership, natural resource exploitation and business activities, industrial
activities that were stipulated under the Philippine constitution as reserved for Filipino citizens
only.113 In order to give Americans such a favored ‘parity’ status, the country had to amend the
constitution which required the vote of three-fourths of all the members of the legislature. The
absence of the disqualified DA candidates allowed the parity amendment to pass by one vote.
This expulsion of their elected officials only worsened the violence in the Central Luzon,
with all of the rising unrest and criminality blamed solely on the DA and the Huks. This
accusation was not fully made up as Taruc himself admitted that the Huk did have some rogue
elements that used their peasant army for private gain. Nonetheless, the violence that was
perpetrated and blamed on the Huks was a minor percentage of the instances of violence that were
also conducted by the landlords and their private armies, as well as by the mailed fist policy of
the Philippine armed forces, with Roxas feeling no sympathy for these voters that had supported
his opponent. The increase in violence drove man peasants underground and rejoined the Huk
army.
Yet despite their expulsion, DA leaders such as Jesus Lava still refused to be drawn into
armed rebellion against the government and continued to push the Communist Party position that
parliamentary struggle was still possible. DA leaders continued to meet with the government in
hopes of finding an amicable solution. But on 24 August 1946, noted peasant leader and Huk
spokesman Juan Feleo was kidnapped by armed men in military uniform while on his way to a
meeting with Taruc and Casto Alejandrino. His body would be found floating in the Pampanga
river in the following month. Though no one ever figured out who kidnapped and killed Feleo, it
was highly suspect that civilian guards, possibly under orders from Central Luzon landlords, had
committed the crime. Feleo’s murder ended any attempts by the Huk leadership to remain
pacifist. By September 1946, just a few weeks after the country’s independence was finally
113
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recognized by the United States, Central Luzon was once again at war and the Huk rebellion had
begun.114
Sadly, despite the steamroller tactics employed to pass the Philippine Trade Act treaty,
US capital did not flow into the Philippines in substantial amounts. At the time of independence
in 1946, direct investments of non-resident Americans stood barely at US$100 million. These
had climbed to only US$150 million by 1950 and to US$188 million three years later. The
climate of civil war and political instability that developed, partially caused by the Machiavellian
machinations required for the passage of the treaty, made many foreign investors rightfully
cautious. The Trade Act established near total trade and investment domination of US businesses
in the Philippines, but its very operation was ruinous in its effects.115
In both size and organizational strength, the Huk peasant rebellion grew between 1946
and 1948. The peasant rebels formed squads and squadrons similar to those created during the
war. Their military actions included fighting the police and civilian guards, ambushing patrols
and destroying the properties of landlords that abused their tenants. In response, Roxas declared
the HMB and PKM as outlaws in March 1948 and waged an all-out war against the armed
peasants.116
The government would suffer a major setback when in April 1948, Roxas suddenly died
of a heart attack. His vice president and successor, Elpidio Quirino, was widely seen as lacking
the ability to lead the government, and in fact, would be hounded by corruption allegations
throughout his tenure. Nonetheless, Quirino attempted to make peace with the Huks by offering
amnesty to the rebels, provided they lay down their arms. The failure of the amnesty drive
because of the Huk’s insistence of keeping their arms led to an escalation of the conflict, with the
Hukbalahap army re-labeling itself as the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB, People’s
Liberation Army).117
At this point, the Communist Party, which had previously avowed the armed rebellion,
began to take full control over the leadership of the HMB. The party would infuse the HMB
rebellion with Marxist-Leninist thought, aiming to establish Soviet-type socialism in the
Philippines. The HMB’s vision included a mass nationalization of industry and the seizure and
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redistribution of vast landholdings for the peasantry. The Philippine movement was no longer
just a movement based on the existing social conditions of Central Luzon but as part of a larger
struggle against imperialism and exploitation that was transpiring worldwide.118
In 1949, the Quirino administration would suffer from a political and economic crisis that
would fan the flames of the rebellion and stoke fear in the United States that its ex-colony would
become communist. During the early post-war years, the Philippines had enjoyed windfall dollar
receipts through the spending by American soldiers, US disbursements for salaries for local
personnel, veterans’ payments to Philippine soldiers, and of course, the war reparations payments
themselves. Much of the war reparations, which should have been invested in the production of
goods and services needed for economic recovery, went largely toward the consumption of
American-made goods, such as radios, Lucky Strike cigarettes, apples and oranges, that had been
absent before the war. Worse, war funds were utilized by corrupt government officials for
distribution to those closest to the regime or even for their own private gain. For example, the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, tasked to sell 200 million pesos worth of surplus military
property turned over only 28 million pesos to the government after three years of operation, with
the rest never having been accounted for.119 By the end of the decade, with the war damage
payments having been paid out, this pool of foreign fund inflows had disappeared, creating a
balance of payments crisis and an economy on the brink of collapse.
The economic crisis was worsened by the tremendous government spending on the
November 1949 elections, which pitted the unpopular incumbent Quirino against wartime
president Laurel.120 The massive fraud and terror employed by Quirino to win far exceeded any
such previous episode in Philippine history. Official records estimated more than one fifth of the
ballots were said to be spurious and many Filipinos wisecracked that even the birds and bees
voted in some precincts.121 By December 1949, the government was faced with imminent
bankruptcy, as its fiscal irresponsibility made its international reserves decline to critical levels.
It was unsurprising that the rebellion was strongest from about this point until early 1951,
with the HMB numbered between 11,000 to 15,000 fighters, roughly equal to the armed strength
of the wartime Huk army. The HMB invoked support from a mass base of about one to two
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million rural peasants. Besides becoming more numerous, the HMB had become better organized
than its wartime predecessor, dividing itself into field commands and battalions. The HMB
maintained guerilla tactics such as robbing payroll offices or intercepting cargo trucks to pay for
their expenses. Supplementing their confiscations were peasant contributions and their own
agricultural production bases in the mountains. In 1950, rumors circulated around Manila social
circles that the Huks were just months away from capturing the presidential palace;122 a rumor
President Quirino himself likely believed, mooring a motor launch beside the palace to evacuate
him and his family.123
But the HMB rebellion would not prosper. The US government, fearful that its former
colony would fall into the hands of the communist movement, increased military aid to the
Philippines to improve training and provide better equipment to the Philippine armed forces. The
Philippine government successfully put down the HMB rebellion by means of large-scale military
operations combined with a policy of attraction.
The US government helped reorganized the Philippine Army and Constabulary into
battalion combat teams and beginning in 1950, massive searches and screening campaigns were
initiated in areas where the HMB was thought to exist. The government initiated a campaign to
provide ‘cash incentives’ of up to 100,000 pesos (US$50,000 at prevailing exchange rates)
leading to the capture of HMB rebels. In October 1950, the anti-HMB campaign made a major
breakthrough when it captured the entire Communist Party politburo, including Jose Lava, the
lawyer-brother of Jesus and Vicente, in a raid in Manila, creating a public impression that the
movement was losing its steam.124
Another important but less understood reason for the failure of the Huk rebellion is the
migration by many impoverished peasants to less populated areas in Mindanao. The program that
began as an abject failure during the early American period, succeeded dramatically during the
post-war years. In the first 15 years of the postwar period, more than a million people from the
northern and central islands moved to the southern ‘frontier’ of Mindanao. This migration was
largely spontaneous and had little government support. Utilizing family and village networks,
migrants from Pampanga and other Central Luzon provinces, as well as other inhabitants of Cebu
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and Bohol moved their families to the Misamis, Agusan and Davao provinces in Northern and
Eastern Mindanao. While migrants from the Ilocos region in Luzon, plus the islands of Panay
and Negros settled in the Cotabato region in Southern Mindanao. The wholesale migration of
communities from the Huk-influenced areas indirectly aided government efforts to deprive
guerillas of their peasant supporters. By easing pressure in these politically explosive regions,
migration postponed further class conflict by at least another generation.
This phenomenon was well understood by the government, prompting them to create
programs to resettle surrendered Huk supporters and sympathizers. The Economic Development
Corporation (EDCOR) project settled ex-Huks to Lanao and Cotabato and provided these rebels
with a piece of land and a way out of poverty.125 Although by the end of the EDCOR program
fewer than 1,000 families were resettled with government support, the propaganda depicting the
rehabilitation efforts depleted the mass base of the HMB.126
The US government also had to ensure that the Philippine economy would return to a
path of economic prosperity. Forced under the Philippine Trade Act to seek approval from the US
government for any changes in its exchange rate policy, the Philippine government had to
persuade the US president to agree to the imposition of exchange and import controls. Alarmed
by the victory of Communist forces in China that same year and the growing radicalization of
Filipino peasants, the US government realized that the severity of the crisis could lead to a
communist takeover of the country and approved the plan for the Philippine Central bank to
control access to foreign currency. But what was approved as an emergency measure was
increasingly utilized by the Philippine government as a mechanism to regain its economic
sovereignty through import controls and industrialize via import substitution.127 As such, the
economic crisis of 1949 would serve as the turning point for the reinvigoration of the Philippine
economy. New industries, especially in the manufacturing sector, were set up, practically from
scratch and many local and foreign investors began investing in the Philippines.
The improvement in the image of the government coincided with a deteriorating image
of the HMB rebels. The brutal murder of Aurora Quezon, widow of former president Manuel
Quezon, by renegade HMB rebels in Nueva Ecija in 1949 shocked the nation. Mrs. Quezon, who
had been involved in social work and was chairman of the Philippine Red Cross at the time of her
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death, was regarded by many citizens as a combination queen-mother and patron saint. The
circumstances surrounding her death inflicted a severe propaganda defeat on the HMB
movement.128
But the most important events that led to the improvement of the government’s image
was the 1951 elections, which in stark comparison with the 1949 bloodbath, was generally
peaceful and honest. This electoral reform occurred through the help of the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) that pressured President Quirino into allowing the newly installed
Defense Secretary, Ramon Magsaysay to use the Philippine Army to oversee the elections, under
the pretext that its results had to be protected from the HMB.129 The US also provided support for
the creation of a citizen’s organization called the National Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL) that also ensured the cleanliness of the balloting.
The promise of clean elections revived the sentiment of faith in the Philippine
government and drove many of the HMB support base to vote, ignoring the boycott call by the
Communist Party that had lost all faith in the country’s democratic processes. The Communist
Party later admitted in December 1951 that the masses no longer recognized the immediate need
for armed struggle and majority of them greatly favored the existence of law and order. Almost a
decade of constant unrest had diminished the masses’ will towards continued support for a failing
rebellion.
It also turned out that that peasants had radically different notions of socialism; its
version remained in the realm of improving their lot rather than radically changing the political
set-up of the country as the Communist Party had continually espoused. Peasant support for the
armed resistance was generally founded merely as a defense against military abuses rather than an
armed struggle to seize state power.130 Any sign of government transformation in the form of less
oppression and agricultural reform diminished peasant support for the rebellion.
But the coup-de-grace occurred in the subsequent election in 1953 when Magsaysay
himself won the presidency. His role as the savior of Philippine elections and chief architect of
the HMB losses made his candidacy unbeatable. His image as a man of the people was further
cultivated with reports of his touring the countryside and eating with the peasants. Running on a
platform of land reform and clean governance, he defeated Quirino by a landslide.
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Magsaysay came through with his promise with the passage of an Agricultural Tenacy
Act in 1954 and a Land Reform Act in 1955. Though both acts were riddled with loopholes by
the landlord-ridden Congress, their mere passage solidified Magsaysay’s image as a pro-poor
reformer. Despite his early enthusiasm for land reform, Magsaysay avoided the key issue of
structural change, which would have pitted him against entrenched landowning interests. As
such, he emphasized programs with immediate benefits, such as the promises of new lands
through the EDCOR program. He even ran programs for purely cosmetic results, such as his
opening of the presidential palace to the masses and his rural projects that consisted of the
digging of artesian wells in far-flung areas; which despite their limited impact in improving rural
welfare, remain engrained in popular memory today. Though Magsaysay’s policies met a few
critical peasant needs, it ignored the broader issues of land ownership and tenancy conditions.131
However, Magsaysay did succeed in eliminating corruption in many sectors of the
government. Not having relied on any vested interest or political parties for his elections,
Magsaysay was free to appoint a cadre of idealistic technocrats to improve government services;
among those he appointed were Manuel Manahan, who cleaned up the notoriously Philippine
Customs. Throughout the Magsaysay presidency, there was a notable absence of charges of
corruption against the administration, in stark contrast to his predecessors. By sheer weight of his
charisma and accomplishments, Magsaysay single-handedly brought many Filipino’s faith in the
government.
A few months into the Magsaysay presidency, in May 1954, Luis Taruc, the supreme
commander of the HMB surrendered and practically ended the HMB-led civil war. With the
death of the HMB rebellion came the death of the Communist Party and most tragically, of the
Democratic Alliance.
The labor movement was also assuaged by the improvements in the country’s economy.
The import and exchange controls begun in 1949 allowed the Philippines to embark on a massive
industrialization program that allowed the economy to steadily grow during the 1950s and 1960s.
Beside the protectionist policies, the industrialization program provided tax exemptions, liberal
credit facilities and windfall profits from a still overvalued currency that allowed for a rapid
increase in industrial production in the country. The country’s gross domestic product (GDP)
grew at an almost 8 percent annual clip during the Quirino presidency and by almost 7 percent
per annum during the Magsaysay era.132 The improving economy, coupled with stable prices,
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diminished the sentiment of exploitation from the labor sector, and the industrial scene avoided
disruptive disputes during this time.133
The weakening of the urban communist movement during the 1950s was not just a
function of an improving economy. Government action was very critical in splintering the union
movement and preventing its conversion into a potent political force. As part of its anti-Huk
movement, the government viewed the CLO as a front for communism and began a crackdown
by capturing the CLO’s leadership in the early 1950s. Ironically, this crackdown occurred when
the more radical communists of the organization, such as Mariano Balgos and Capadocia, had
already left the organization to join the Huks in the Central Luzon. The more moderate unions,
such as the Manila Railroad union, decided to also secede from the organization, lest they too be
repressed by the government. 134 In April 1951, the Labor Secretary revoked the legal standing of
the CLO and its leaders, including its chairman Amado Hernandez, were arrested and charged
with sedition.135 With no one willing to replace its leadership, by the end of that year, the CLO
would be dead.
The death of the CLO signaled the extermination of not only a unifying umbrella labor
group but also of the communist ideology among the existing company unions. Organized labor
shifted ideologies from the political radicalism of the 1930s and 40s to the more ‘bread and
butter’ unionism, deeply eroding whatever class awareness the union movement had shown in
earlier decades.136 Moreover, the union movements became quite fragmented, especially as new,
unrelated industries sprung up around the country.
The government repression was also coupled with the passage of more pro-labor policies,
such as the passage of Industrial Peace Act in 1953, which liberalized registration procedures for
unions – previously used as a weapon to control unions – and encouraged conciliation of
industrial disputes.

The rural-based legislators found it politically advantageous to support

legislation for urban workers, since agricultural workers were generally exempted from these
laws. Ironically, the laborers were able to obtain concessionary legislation, despite the fact that
unlike its rural-based counterpart, the labor unions were never able to become a significant
electoral bloc and garner electoral victories.
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As such, the trade unions that were created during the 1950s and 1960s, such as Olalia’s
National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and former CLO chairman Cipriano Cid’s
Philippine Association of Free Labor Union (PAFLU), although still socialist in its roots and
leadership, became less militant in their actions. These unions resorted primarily to collective
bargaining and arbitrations and as such, there were hardly any street demonstrations or rallies
during these periods. Even plant-level strikes diminished significantly in the mid-50s.137
Interestingly, the 1950s saw the rise of a new form of trade unionism coming from two
fronts. The first was an attempt by the Philippine government to control the Philippine labor
movement by itself organizing the National Confederation of Trade Unions (NACTU) in 1950,
supposedly as a counterweight against the communist unions.

The government favored

conservative unions that joined the NACTU and provided funding or even government positions
to union leaders that followed their bidding. It would later become apparent that the NACTU,
which was led by Jose Figueras, Labor Secretary, was solely being used to promote the political
ambition and senatorial campaign of its leader.
Later that year, another group of workers who refused to be dominated by the
communists, politicians, governments, employers or racketeers founded the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW). Founded by lawyer Juan Tan and Fr. Walter Hogan of the Society of Jesus, the
FFW provided an alternative to communism that was based on Catholic social teaching. At the
onset, it fought mainly for labor union independence, vocally attacking government officials that
used unions to further their own ambitions. Later, with the passage of the 1953 Industrial Peace
Act which diminished government control over unions, the FFW’s democratic struggle subsided
and it focused on economic issues, particularly on providing legal aid during collectivebargaining negotiations.138
A similar movement was formed for the peasant classes with the creation of the
Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) in 1953. Inspired by the work of his former teacher, Fr. Hogan,
lawyer and landlord Jeremias Montemayor, together with FFW official Fernando Esguerra,
organized the FFF after the HMB revolt had lost its momentum. The FFF sought harmony,
instead of conflict, among classes and also focused on Catholic social teachings in its ideological
bias. It advocated family-sized farms rather than collectivization of farmlands as a means for
improving farmer welfare. After the collapse of the HMB and with it the PKM and the other pre-
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war peasant movements, the FFF became the dominant peasant movement of the 1950s and
1960s.139
The country under Magsaysay seemed to be proceeding towards a new dawn. But
unfortunately, fate intervened. The universally beloved President Magsaysay died in a plane crash
on 17 March 1957. Neither his replacement, Vice President Carlos Garcia nor his subsequent
successor, Diosdado Macapagal had the charisma or the reformist zeal of Magsaysay. In fact, the
moment Garcia took over the presidency, Magsaysay’s reformers were eased out of their
positions and the country saw a return of many of the corrupt practices that had existed during the
time of Quirino. Within six months into the Garcia presidency, false bills of lading became
standard at the Manila harbor, coconut products were smuggled in huge amounts and payoff
systems became standard practice for many government transactions.140
However, despite the loss of Magsaysay, the chaos brought about by the Great
Depression, World War II and Reconstruction that had wreaked havoc on Philippine society was
truly now a thing of the past. The independent Philippine nation had become a showcase of
democracy and economic growth for the region, although admittedly a less than perfect one. Even
as the import-substituting industrialization program lost steam in the late 50s, President Diosdado
Macapagal entered into a liberalization program during the 1960s that spurred further Philippine
economic growth in the subsequent decade.
The economic growth and political stability experienced by the country in the 1950s and
1960s extinguished the fire that fuelled the 1930s communist movement. Now numbering just in
the hundreds, the HMB finally disbanded its army in 1958. The rest of the Communist Party’s
surviving officials would be captured in subsequent military maneuvers; Alejandrino would fall
into government hands in 1960, while the last of the Lava brothers, Jesus Lava, would be
captured in 1964.141 The radical labor and peasant movements that these leaders had midwifed
were been replaced by more moderate voices supported by the Catholic Church.
But the tragedy of the era was the death of the peasant-based political party. Beginning in
the 1930s, Pedro Abad Santos’ Popular Front party succeeded in mobilizing the peasantry of
Central Luzon into an electoral force that succeeded in electing councilors and mayors in many
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rural areas. In the 1940s, this electoral party had grown into the Democratic Alliance that
generated landslide victories in province-wide voting in six congressional districts. Had the
Democratic Alliance been allowed to contest future elections, it would have likely won
gubernatorial control in at least two provinces of Central Luzon. These victories would have
transformed the Democratic Alliance into a genuine political movement that could have
eventually challenged elite dominance of Philippine elections, bringing much needed competition
that would have at least forced the existing political class to govern with less self-interest.
However, the ejection of the DA congressmen in 1946 inadvertently caused the Huk
rebellion that ironically destroyed all of the political gains that Abad Santos had begun two
decades prior. For the rest of the period, the twin elite-based Nacionalista and Liberal Parties
would maintain total dominance of the Philippine democratic processes, creating a faux two-party
system that in reality maintained identical platforms and constantly traded candidates amongst
themselves. Until today, no mass based political party, whether moderate or communist in
ideology, has succeeded in duplicating the success of the Democratic Alliance. As such, today’s
labor and peasant unions remain stuck with only the ability to influence national policies
externally, instead of from within the government.
Unfortunately, the agricultural and labor ills that were the prime causes of the 1930s
communist movement and the 1950s Huk rebellion were never fully resolved. Political turmoil
and economic catastrophes in the following decades would once again provide fodder for the rise
of another communist party and a new people’s army.
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